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The third power listed on the Constitution’s description of federal powers gives 
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, with Indian tribes and 
among the states.1  Commentators now describe the commerce clause as “plenary”2 and 
as “the single most important source of national power.”3  In the 1930’s, the Supreme 
Court turned from a narrow, restricting interpretation of “commerce” to a loose and 
permissive interpretation, and in that debate, and its current reiterations, the commerce 
clause has been treated as the broadest general power of the federal government and the 
frontier most likely to mark the outer boundaries of federal jurisdiction.4  The commerce 
clause is also now described as a “strong impetus for calling the Constitutional 
Convention.” 5  Contemporaries listed regulation of commerce as one of the 
*
  Andrews and Kurth Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK 105 (2d ed. 1979)
3
  Robert J. Steamer, Commerce Power in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 167 (Kermit Hall, ed., 1992); accord, SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 105 (The commerce clause is 
the “source of the most important powers that the Federal Government exercises.”)
4 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 867 (1976)(Brennan, J. dissenting)(saying 
that “it may have been the eventual abandonment of that overly restrictive construction of the commerce 
power that spelled defeat for the Court-packing plan, and preserved the integrity of this institution, … but 
my Brethren today are transparently trying to cut back on that recognition of the scope of the commerce 
power”).   For a recent review of the judicial history of the scope of the commerce clause, see, e.g., Barry 
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1100-
1113 (2000).
5
  Robert J. Steamer, supra note 5, at 167.
2Constitution’s major purposes.   Washington’s cover letter transmitting the Convention’s 
draft of the Constitution to the old Congress listed five new powers, saying that the desire 
is that that national government would have the power “to make war, peace, and treaties, 
levy money and to regulate commerce.”6  Anti-Federalist Richard Henry Lee listed tax to 
pay the war debts and the commerce power as the purposes of the Constitution.7  If the 
commerce clause was even a contributory cause of the constitutional revolution, it is 
important. 
This review of the constitutional debates, however, strongly indicates that the 
power to “regulate commerce” does not have much weight to explain why the 
Constitution was adopted.  This review reinforces the conclusion, reached by a quite old 
but superb article, that the commerce clause was originally “a modest little power.” 8
The Commerce Clause has grown to be important only by evolution and the passage of 
6
  Letter from [George Washington] the President of the Federal Convention to the President of Congress 
(Sept. 17, 1787), in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN 
STATES 1003 (Charles C. Tansill, ed. 1927).
7
  Anti-Federalist Richard Henry Lee treated the commerce power as the motivation for the Constitution in 
his letter to George Mason of May 15, 1787, 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792, at 876 (Robert 
A. Rutland, ed. 1970)(hereinafter GEORGE MASON PAPERS):
The present causes of complaint seem to be, that Congress cannot command the money necessary 
for the just purposes of paying debts, or for supporting the federal government; and that they 
cannot make treaties of commerce, unless power unlimited, of regulating trade be given.
See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 501 
(saying that “most of our political evils may be traced to our commercial ones.”)
8
  Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 
25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 481 (1941).
3time.   If we are to be bound by the original meaning of the commerce clause in strict 
historical context, there is nothing within the power to regulate commerce that has any 
importance.
“Regulation of commerce” was most importantly a cover of words for the 
program of nationalizing the state “imposts” or taxes on imports.  Under the mercantilist 
economics then dominant, any restriction on imports would preserve precious specie and 
serve the national welfare.  Revenue was also critical to the Founders to restore the public 
credit.  But revenue was adequately described as a tax measure, authorized by other 
provisions, so that commerce clause was not needed for tax issues.  
“Regulation of commerce” was also used as a reference for three restrictive 
mercantilist programs that never had enough political strength behind them to be 
seriously considered: (1)  an American Navigation Act, giving Northern shippers a 
monopoly on the export of Southern commodities, (2) a retributional impost against the 
British to induce them to open up the West Indies ports to American ships and (3) port 
preferences requiring that all dealings with foreigners be conducted through preferred 
ports.  None of the three ever amounted to anything and indeed port preferences were 
banned by the Philadelphia Convention itself.   Notwithstanding the word cover used, 
programs without genuine political support can not be used to explain the Constitutional 
revolution.
Finally, this review shows that interstate commerce was not at issue in the 
debates.   The Founders cared a lot about fairness between the states, but their concerns 
were focused almost entirely in various provisions outside the commerce clause.  
Interstate tolls and discriminatory regulations were already banned by the articles of 
4confederation and interstate tolls were not a realistic threat.  The  Constitution was not 
needed to ban them.  
“Regulation of commerce” was given to the national government to accomplish 
specific programs the Framers desired.  To determine the meaning of the words in strict 
historical context, one must strip away the cover of words and look at the programs 
underneath. Words do have a penumbra beyond the programs that they were trying to 
accomplish, but the words of any historical document are always actions attempting to 
find allies to accomplish a program, and to understand even the penumbra of words one 
must first understand the core programs.9  “Regulation of Commerce” is a vague, 
umbrella phrase that might cover a very wide range of grievances, but it is possible from 
the sample to decipher “regulation of commerce” into the specific programs that the 
advocates of the Constitution wanted.   
  To determine what was meant by “regulation of  commerce,” this article collects 
and categorizes 157 uses of the phrase “regulation of commerce” or the word 
“commerce” in the debates over the Constitution.  One hundred thirty-six of those uses 
are associated with a specific goal or program and it is those 136 uses that forms the 
100% used as a baseline to measure the relative weight of the programs, as percentage of 
sampled quotes.  The samples come from both sides of the debate and the sampling was 
intended to be omnivorous.10  Usually the meaning of “regulation of commerce” comes 
9 See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding the History of Ideas in MEANING AND 
UNDERSTANDING:  QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 3, 55-65, 260 (James Tully, ed., 1988).
10
  As many of the cites as possible were picked up electronically by searching the following web data 
bases:  PHILIP KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/; MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
5as an unintended by-product of the speaker’s vigorous argument and usually the speakers 
do not seem to be manipulating the meaning of “regulation of commerce” to stretch or 
contract the definition of “commerce.”  One must generally be suspicious that speeches in 
the ratification are insincere.  The proponents of the Constitution understated the meaning 
of the Constitution to get it passed and the opponents exaggerated its impact to get it 
defeated.  Still, when the debaters were spinning out some other argument, the definition 
of “commerce” they assumed is more reliable.11  It is the main argument and not the 
assumed side definition of regulation of commerce that the speaker is spinning.    
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html, JAMES MADISON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JOHN JAY, 
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm, and JONATHAN ELLIOT, 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html. 
11
  There is at least one exchange in which the debaters seem to spinning the definition of “regulation of 
commerce.”  On September 14, 1787 at the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason was plausibly trying 
to move the definition of regulation of commerce.  James Wilson had just said that “regulation of 
commerce” gives Congress the power to grant monopolies and corporate charters.  Mason opposed 
monopolies and said, I think insincerely, they were not included in the power to regulate commerce.  James 
Wilson, George Mason, Speeches before the Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S 
RECORDS 639-640.  Mason, the next day, proposed an amendment to require a two-thirds majority for
Navigation Acts, to prevent Congress from giving shippers a monopoly that might allow them to set their 
price for Southern crops and reduce their value by “perhaps 50 Per Ct” (2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 631), and a 
Navigation Act that Mason opposed was a monopoly on shipping.  If Mason was right on September 14 
that regulation of commerce did not include navigation act monopolies, he would not have needed the two-
thirds restriction on the Navigation Act that he proposed on September 15.  Mason would later come to
conclude that even as construed by the proponents of the Constitution, Congress could “grant monopolies 
in trade and commerce.”  George Mason, Objections to the Proposed Constitution, in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 
6The sampling did not pick up dictionary definitions.12  Dictionaries are, at best, a 
sampling of usages from some time or place.  There is very considerable danger in using 
dictionary definitions to smuggle quotes out of context and from unrelated controversies 
into the Constitutional text.  A dictionary definition seems like the best way to infect the 
archeological site with artifacts from another place and time.  All of the samples here are 
from debates related broadly to the formulation or adoption of the Constitution.  On 
another day, the samples might have been organized with different categories and some 
quotes might have been put into different bins, but the quibbles at the margin do not 
materially lower the validity of the conclusions. 
The table immediately following summarizes the results of the sampling.  
“Commerce” in the constitutional debates referred primarily, at 82% of the program-
associated quotes, to Atlantic Ocean shipping.   The most important issues within 
496.  Accord, Elbridge Gerry, Debate at the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S 
RECORDS 635 (Rufus King notes)(also objecting to the Constitution because it would allow the Legislature 
to create companies and monopolies.)  Granting commercial monopolies and franchises would have been 
an ordinary government instrument of the mercantilist times.  See, e.g., Jacob Viner, Economic Thought: 
Mercantilist Thought, 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 440 (David L. Sills, ed. 
1968)(listing granting monopolies to private companies as a typical tool of mercantilism.)
12
  Other scholars have used dictionaries and collected uses quite far removed from the Constitutional 
debate.  Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
14-19 (British usage), 17-21 (American usage)(1999); WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE 
POWER TO GOVERN: THE CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW 42-63 (1937); WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, 
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 50-292 (1953)(citing English 
and American dictionaries, newspapers, pamphlets, correspondences, treatises, legislative debates and other 
historical records for the proposition that “to regulate commerce” means to govern all gainful activity.)
7“regulation of commerce” were tax issues: “to regulate commerce” meant “to tax it” 
(26% of program-associated quotes), and tax was adequately covered by clauses outside 
of the commerce clause. The remainder of the actively-proposed programs under 
“regulation of commerce,” besides tax, were restrictions on foreign trade, consistent with 
the then-dominant economic philosophy of mercantilism.   Proponents of the Constitution 
advocated retributional tariffs against the British to punish the British for excluding 
American ships from the British West Indies (28%) and they advocated giving American 
ships a monopoly on the export of American commodities (22%).  None of the mercantile 
restrictions amounted to much, however, even after the Constitution was ratified.  
“Commerce” was also used as a justification for restrictions on the states to protect out-
of-state citizens (17%), but the remedies are mostly specified outside of the commerce 
clause.  The language of the commerce clause also covers trade with the Indians and 
commerce among the states, but there were no active debates or proposals that show up in 
the 157 samples under either trade with the Indians or among the states.  
8Sample of 157 cites for “Commerce” categorized
Percent of references to 
programs (136 total)
1. Deep water shipping 112 82%
a.  Regulation of commerce means taxation 35 26%
b.  Retribution to open foreign ports 38 28%
c.  Restrictions on U.S. ports. 30 22%
d.  Other foreign shipping   9
2. U.S. Border Land Issues   1   1    1%
3. Equity between States 23  17%
a. Interstate Commerce 13 10%
b. Fairness of one state to another reflected 
in other clauses.
10
Sum of reference to programs 136 100%
4. Words without Controversies 21
a. Commerce apart from manufacture and 
agriculture
 15
c.  Too vague to categorize   6
A.  Deep Water Shipping
For 82% of the cites, “regulation of commerce” relates to Atlantic Ocean 
shipping.  Gordon Wood has argued that “commerce” usually referred to international 
trade in the eighteenth century13 and the sample confirms that description.  The four most 
important programs mentioned in the Constitutional debates related to international trade:  
(1) nationalization of the state imposts, (2) retaliation against the British for restrictions 
on West Indies shipping;  (3) port preferences, and (4) an American Navigation Act.  All 
were all deep-water shipping issues and within the then-dominant economic philosophy 
of mercantilism. 
1.  The Impost
13 GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 316  (1992).  Wood argues that 
“commerce” and did not begin to refer domestic trades until the nineteenth century, which is beyond the 
borders of the time period sampled here.
9The most important “commerce” issue in the ratification debate was the state 
imposts.  The core grievance was the 2-1/2% impost that New York State imposed on 
imports coming in through New York harbor.14  For thirty-two cites, regulation of 
commerce means federalizing the state imposts, chiefly New York’s, so as to allow the 
federal government to get the revenue from tax on foreign imports.15  Closely related is 
14 See, e.g., 1784 N.Y. Laws 12 (Nov. 18, 1784): The 2-1/2% rate was the default rate; for listed goods, 
e.g., Madeira wine, a specific amount was set per case in shillings or pence.
15
 (1) David Ramsey (So. Carolina), Speech to the Continental Congress (Jan. 27, 1783) in  25 JCC 869
(saying that states could not pay the revolutionary debts because “rivalships relative to trade wd. impede a 
regular impost”); (2)  James Madison, Address to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled 
(Apr. 26, 1783), in 24 JCC 277, 278  (advocating state ratification of 5% federal impost to pay the debts of 
the Revolutionary War because impost can not be used without concerted uniformity, properly achieved 
through Congress, because of the position of more commercial states);  (3) Report of a Committee of 
Spraight, Monroe, et. al. to Continental Congress, (March 3, 1786), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES  111 
(reporting proposal to allow Congress to lay such imposts and duties on imports and exports as may be 
necessary to regulate the trade of the states with foreign nations and with each other);  (4) “Z,” Philadelphia 
Freeman’s J., May 16, 1787, 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 99 (“It has been seen that the States individually 
cannot, with any success pretend to regulate trade.  The duties and restrictions which one State imposes, the 
neighbouring States enable the merchant to evade.”);  (5)  Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Federal 
Convention (May 29, 1787)  1 FARRAND’S RECORDS 19 (Madison notes) (saying that that there were many 
advantages, which the U.S. could not attain under the confederation “such as a productive impost--
counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations -- pushing of commerce ad libitum-- &c 
“&c.”);  (6) Roger Sherman, Speech before the Federal Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 F ARRAND’S 
RECORDS 143 (referring to “powers to regulate comerce & draw therefrom a revenue”);  (7)  Nathaniel 
Gorham, Speech before the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 90 (saying that 
New York is much attached to her present advantage “of taxing her neighbours by the regulation of her 
trade”); (8) Edmund Randolph, Draft of the Constitution for Committeee on Detail, July 1787, 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 142 (categorizing “regulation of commerce both foreign and domestic” as fifth 
subdivision under congressional power to tax); (9) James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 
16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 306  (dwelling on the injustice of leaving “N. Jersey Connecticut &c 
any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours”) (emphasis added) ; (10) John Mercer 
(Maryland), Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 307 (opposing  
giving Congress power to tax exports because the States now a right to tax both imports and exports of their 
10
uncommercial neighbours and [i]t was enough for them to sacrifice one half of it”) (emphasis added);  (11) 
Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 1787) in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 308 (saying 
that “[t]he oppression of the uncommercial States was guarded agst. by [Congress’s] power to regulate 
trade between the States”); (12) Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 
MADISON PAPERS 205, 211 (saying that there was no definable distinction between the power of regulating 
trade and that of drawing revenue from it.); (13) THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Nov. 7, 1787) (Alexander 
Hamilton) (citing as a need for the Constitution, the opportunities which some states including New York 
“have of rendering others tributary to them, by commercial regulations”); (14) HUGH WILLIAMSON, SPEECH 
AT EDENTON, NORTH CAROLINA (NOV. 8, 1787) reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 231 (saying 
that by imposts and other regulations of commerce, it will be in the power of government  to collect a vast 
revenue for the general benefit of the nation); (15) THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 72 (Nov. 17, 1787) 
(Alexander Hamilton) (saying that a general union will be conducive to the interests of commerce and 
extend the revenue to be drawn from it); (16) James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification 
Convention, Nov. 24, 1787, in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 141 (“Devoid of power, we could neither prevent 
the excessive importations which lately deluged the country, nor even raise from that excess a contribution 
to the public revenue”); (17) THE FEDERALIST NO.12, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Nov. 27, 1787) (saying 
that the “single article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable 
revenue”) (emphasis added); (18) Landowner IX, Connecticut Courant, Dec. 31, 1787 reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 192 (saying that New York impost draws 40,000 pounds from Connecticut and 
ruins our foreign trade);  (19) Charles Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), 
in 4 Elliot’s Debates 253-54 (saying that loss of credit and inability in our citizens to pay taxes were the 
result of the “destruction of our commerce, caused by other nations’ restrictions that the general 
government could not counteract”); (20) Rawlins Lowndes, Debate in the South Carolina Legislature (Jan. 
16, 1788), in 2 D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 22 (saying that Congress by the 1783 Impost proposal asked 
for the power to regulate commerce for only a limited time and opposing the Constitution because it gave 
Congress the power to regulate commerce ad infinitum); (21) THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 262 (Jan. 18, 
1788) (James Madison) (asking “was it not an acknowledged object … that the regulation of trade should 
be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general 
revenue?); (22) Thomas Dawes, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES 58 (saying that state imposts drive the trade to neighboring states making the states rely on taxes 
on land to satisfy requisitions, and objecting to different systems of duties in different states);  (23) THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (Jan. 22, 1788) (James Madison) (saying that the object of the power of 
regulating commerce was the “…relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the 
improper contributions levied on them by the latter.”);   (24) THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 301 (Jan. 25, 
1788) (James Madison) (saying that the prohibition of state taxes on imports and exports is proven by the 
necessity of “submitting regulation of trade to foederal councils”);  (25) Charles Pinckney, Speech in the 
House of Representatives, 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong., 1st Sess. 1318 (Feb. 14, 1820) (arguing that 
11
the prohibition the Constitution adopted on states laying taxes on exports, again to 
prevent the “commercial states” with deep-water harbors from abusing their 
uncommercial neighbors by taxing shipments of goods produced by their neighbors for 
export (3 cites).16
Congress could not prohibit movement of slaves to territories because power over inter-state commerce by 
water between the states was given to prevent port preferences and the obligations of paying duties on 
commerce to another state);  (26) “A Farmer,” Philadelphia Freeman’s J., April 23, 1788 reprinted in 17 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 139 (saying that power of regulating commerce ought to belong to the general 
government and that the burden of debt incurred by the revolution has rendered a general revenue 
necessary, so that imposts upon importations present themselves, not only as a source of revenue, but as 
revenue for which the governments of the particular states are incompetent); (27)  “A Plebian,” An Address 
to the People of New York, April 17, 1788, reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 160 (not objecting to 
granting the general government power to regulate trade and lay imposts for that purpose, as well as raising 
revenue, but saying that the hopes from the change will never realized because the country buys more than 
it sells and because there are too many merchants);  (28) “To Be or Not to Be?  Is the Question, New 
Hampshire Gazette, April 18, 1788, in 2 DEBATES ON THE CONSTITUTION  404 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1992) 
(“an increased revenue from a proper and universal regulation of trade will render needless so large a dry 
tax as we have been subject to);  (29) Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), reprinted 
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 477 (encouragement of manufacturing was an object of the power to regulate 
trade, as indicated that Framers and Ant-Federalists in the first Congress had proposed duties and even 
prohibitions of articles that competed with domestic production); (30) Letter from James Madison to 
Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 18, 1828), reprinted in @@ FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION @@ (saying that power to 
lay imposts is included in the power to regulate trade, even though tax is expressed separately);  (31) Letter 
from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 477 (saying 
that federal power over interstate commerce “grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in 
taxing the non-importing”); (32)  Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 547 (saying that want of a general congressional power over commerce led to an 
exercise of this power separately by the States, engendered undercutting rivalry and “vain attempts to 
supply their respective treasuries by imposts”).
16
  (1) James Wilson, Debate in the Federal Convention (Aug. 21, 1781), in 1 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 455 
(saying that to deny the federal government the power to tax exports is “is to take from the common 
government half the regulation of trade”); (2) Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 
12
New York had vetoed the 1783 proposal to give the general government the 
revenue from an impost.   New York’s motivation was to retain the revenue from the 
New York harbor impost for exclusive New York needs.17  Under the Articles of 
Confederation, one state could veto any amendment and so New York’s vote was 
sufficient to defeat the federal impost.18  Madison later wrote that New York refused the 
5% impost “for the urgent debt of the Revolution,” just so as “to tax the consumption of 
her neighbours.”19  When New York vetoed the 1783 impost, it is bears repeating, every 
"liberal good man [wished] New York in Hell."20
New York was expected to repeat its veto of nationalization of the impost if again 
given the chance under the unanimity requirements of the Articles of Confederation.   
New York was too much attached to “taxing her neighbours by the regulation of her 
1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 308 (supporting prohibition of tax on exports, but saying that the 
“oppression of the uncommercial States [by commercial states] was guarded agst. by the power to regulate 
trade between the States”); (3) Gouverneur Morris, Speech in the Federal Convention (Aug. 21,1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 360 (arguing that without prohibition, “exporting States will tax the produce of their 
uncommercial neighbours.”). 
17 JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 89-96 (1993).  New 
York, in form, merely set new conditions on approval, including a New York state officer being appointed 
to collect the revenue and New York paper money being accepted for the tax, but the conditions were 
understood on both sides to be tantamount to veto.  New York paper would not help pay Dutch or French or 
Pennsylvania creditors.
18
  Articles of Confederation, art. XIII, 19 JCC 221.
19
  James Madison, Unsent letter to John Tyler (1833), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 530-531. 
20
  Letter from Henry Jackson to Henry Knox (Apr. 23, 1786), quoted in Robert A. Freer, Shay’s Rebellion 
and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388, 398 (1969).
13
trade.”21  “Much opposition is expected in New York,” Timothy Pickering wrote home.22
“That state has long been acting a disingenuous part.  They refused the impost to 
Congress–because half of New Jersey, a great part of Connecticut, the western part of 
Massachusetts and Vermont, received their imported goods through New York, who put 
into her own tresury all the duties arising on the goods consumed in [these] states.”23
New York exclusive use of the revenue from shipping through New York harbor 
was not a program with any attraction out of state.  Connecticut and New Jersey were 
outraged by the New York impost.24  In Connecticut, the proponents of the Constitution 
warned that those “gentlemen in New York who receive large salaries …  know that their 
offices will be more insecure … when the expenses of government shall be paid by their 
21
  Mr. Nathaniel Gorham, Speech at the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 90.
22
  Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Pickering (Dec. 29, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 177.
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES
190-197 (saying that the people of Connecticut, pay annually into the treasury of New York more than fifty 
thousand dollars by reason of the impost on New York harbor traffic); EDITORIAL, NEW ENGLAND 
CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 80, 82 (saying that 
“those gentlemen in New York who receive large salaries … know that their offices will be more insecure 
… when the expenses of government shall be paid by their constituents, than while paid by us.”)  In 1786 
New Jersey announced she would contribute no more by way of requisitions given that the taxes she had 
paid to New York by way of the New York impost were enough. VOTES AND PROCEEDING OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 12, Sess. 10, 2d sitting (1786).  FORREST MCDONALD, 
WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 126,141 (1958) attributes the quick and 
overwhelming ratification of the Constitution by Connecticut and New Jersey to the New York harbor 
impost controversy.
14
constituents, than while paid by us.”25  The New York impost undermined requisitions as 
well.  New Jersey repudiated the 1786 requisition based on the argument that New Jersey 
had paid enough tax already because it received its imports through New York and 
Philadelphia.26  New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was “a Cask 
tapped at both ends.”27  New Jersey and Connecticut ratified the Constitution quickly and 
overwhelmingly to nationalize the New York harbor taxes.28
Rogue Island shared New York’s villainy.  Rhode Island had vetoed a similar 
proposal in 1781 to give Congress a 5% impost.29  “Rhode Island, as a weak State,” 
Madison told Congress in 1783, “[is against the] General revenue as tending … to 
deprive her of the advantage afforded by her situation of taxing the commerce of the 
25 EDITORIAL, NEW ENGLAND CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 80, 82.
26 VOTES AND PROCEEDING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 12, Sess. 10, 2d 
sitting (1786).  See RUTH BOGIN, ABRAHAM CLARK AND THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY IN THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 1774-1794, at 127-131 (1982). 
27
  James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 539, 
542.
28 MCDONALD, supra note 24, at 126,141.  Accord, see James Madison, Notes to Speech to the Continental 
Congress (Feb. 26, 1783), in 25 JCC 913 (saying that both Connecticut and New Jersey favored general 
revenue to protect their commerce against New York tax.) 
29
  Letter from the Rhode Island Speaker of the Assembly, (Nov. 30, 1782), in 23 JCC 788-789 (Dec. 12, 
1782) (announcing that Rhode Island refused the 1781 impost because the impost would be hardest on 
commercial states, would introduce foreign collectors into Rhode Island and would give Congress funding 
independent of its constituents).
15
contiguous States.”30  When Rhode Island vetoed the impost, Rhode Island thereafter 
became the “evil genius” whose veto “injured the United States more than the worth of 
that whole state.”31  Rhode Island was “shameful” and this “perverse sister,”32  this 
“Cursed State, [which] ought to be erased out of Confederation, and … out of the earth, if 
any worse place could be found for them.”33
The Founders also generalized their condemnation beyond New York and Rhode 
Island.  In North Carolina, Hugh Williamson called for ratification of the Constitution to 
end the Virginia and South Carolina taxes on goods imported into North Carolina.34
“Publius” said that the object of the Constitution’s giving Congress the power to regulate 
commerce was relief for the “[s]tates which import and export through other States from 
30
  James Madison, Notes to a Speech to the Continental Congress (Feb. 26, 1783), in 25 JCC 913.  Accord, 
Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the Continental Congress (Feb. 13, 1783) (James Madison, Notes of 
Debates in the Continental Congress), in 25 JCC 902 (saying that “the true objection on the part of R. I. 
was the interference of the impost with the opportunity afforded by their situation of levying contributions 
on Cont., &c, which recd. foreign supplies through the ports of R. I.”). 
31
  State Gazette of South-Carolina (Charleston), June 1, 1786 and “A Fable,” Exchange Adviser (Boston), 
February 11, 1786 both quoted in IRVIN H. POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION, 1774-1795, at 96 
(1969).
32
  James Madison to Edmund Randolph, November 19, 1783, 5 MADISON PAPERS 289.
33
  John Montgomery to Edward Hand, July 26, 1784, 6 LETTERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS 575 (Edmund C. Burnett, ed. 1921-1936).
34 HUGH WILLIAMSON, REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT TO THE FREEMEN OF EDENTON, 
NORTH CAROLINA, DAILY ADVERTISER, NEW YORK (Feb. 25-27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 201, 207.
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the improper contributions levied on them by the latter.”35  Publius also said that under 
the Articles some states have the opportunity of rendering others “tributary” to them by 
laying duties on her importations.36  Hamilton, in his own exposed public role, argued 
that “uncommercial” states would never be able to bear the quota assigned under the 
ordinary rules of apportioning requisitions because they had borne imposts as well.37  The 
uncommercial states would fail in paying their quota, Hamilton argued, their example 
would be followed, and the Union would then inevitably dissolve.38  For the Federalists, 
the state imposts levied by states with good harbors was a prime example of an immoral 
state willing to abuse its neighbors.   
Revenue from foreign imports also required a uniform policy along the whole 
coast.  If one state tried to raise rates, a neighboring state would destroy the revenue by 
undercutting the tax rates to channel commerce in her direction.   The general 
government would regulate commerce with a uniform impost and so make commerce 
productive of general revenue.39
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (James Madison)(first published January 22, 1788) (emphasis added). 
36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published Nov. 17, 1787).
37




  See, e.g., Thomas Dawes, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES 58 (saying that state imposts drive the trade to neighboring states); “Z,” Philadelphia Freeman’s 
J., May 16, 1787, 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 99 (“It has been seen that the States individually cannot, 
with any success pretend to regulate trade.  The duties and restrictions which one State imposes, the 
neighbouring States enable the merchant to evade.”); Madison, Preface To Debates in the Convention of 
1787 (c. 1830), in 3 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 547 (saying that want of a general congressional power over 
commerce led to an exercise of this power separately by the States, engendered undercutting rivalry and 
“vain attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts”).
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The revenue aspects of the imposts was very important to the adoption of the 
Constitution, but the equity aspects of fight over the New York impost is probably 
properly viewed, as Merrill Jensen put it, as a “tempest in a teapot.”40  The New York tax 
at 2-1/2% was probably not even worth smuggling around.  The New York deep-water 
harbor and established docks were probably worth many times that 2-1/2% amount.  It 
was hard to unload a deep water ship without a deep water harbor.41
From 1784 through 1787 New York exempted from its impost goods held for re-
export, provided they were kept in their original package.42  To the extent that New York 
was acting as a wholesaler or middleman, breaking up and distributing imported goods 
for the Vermont, New Jersey and Connecticut countryside, the “original package” 
requirement would have prevented the exemption from applying.  The exemption was 
40 MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 
1781-1789, at 339 (1950);  J. ALBERT GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789, at 
135 (1910).  Merrill Jensen is a historian with not much sympathy for the Federalist proponents of the 
Constitution, and his characterization can be understood as a jab at the Framers, but no jab at the framers is 
intended here in agreeing with Jensen’s conclusion as to the importance of the New York impost.
41
  James Madison,  Letter  to James Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 306, 307 complains 
that prices on Baltimore and Philadelphia docks for Virginia exports were 15-20% higher than on Virginia 
rivers.  If we attribute that entirely to the advantage of good deep water docks versus shallow river docks, 
then the value of deep water facilities would be six to eight times what New York was charging in tax for
their use. 
42
  Laws of New York, 8th Sess., 2d Meeting, at 12 (Nov. 18, 1784); Laws of New York, 10th Sess., at 513 
(Apr. 11, 1787).  South Carolina, Massachusetts and Virginia had similar exemptions for re-exports kept in 
the original package.  Edward Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, 
FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 17-19 (A. Dan Tarlock, ed. 1981).
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narrowed dramatically, however, in April 1787 to apply only if the goods were not landed 
in New York.  The captain of the ship had to take an oath that the exempted goods were 
not intended to be landed or put on shore in New York nor brought back into New York.  
After April 1787, importers could not use the New York harbor wharves to ship through 
New York in the original package without paying the 2-1/2% tax.43  In any event, the 
considerable non-tax advantages of using New York harbor and docks to land cargo and 
break up the package probably meant the exemption was not much used.  New York’s 
neighbors complained about the 2-1/2% tax, but they got enough value out of the harbor 
and docks to pay it.
Federalizing the imposts was the feature of the commerce clause which generated 
almost universal assent, outside of New York and Rhode Island.44  Revenue could be 
collected from imports at all only if the states did not undercut each other.  Only the 
“foederal head with full authority [could prevent]  State Schemes … pursued with 
Surreptitious views against each other, which must eventually destroy a source of 
Revenue that might be immensely valuable to the Union.”45  Hamilton argued that 
imposts by the individual states would be difficult to enforce, because the bays, rivers and 
long borders between the states made smuggling too easy.  On the federal level, however, 
there was only one side to guard–the Atlantic.46  The “impost” was the least objectionable 
federal tax because it could be collected without interfering with the “internal police” of 
43
  Laws of New York, 10th Sess., at 513 (Apr. 11, 1787).  In the 1784 version, a shipper had 60 days to re-
export goods after a landing.  Laws of New York, 8th Sess., 2d Meeting, at 14 (Nov. 18, 1784).
44
  Abel, supra note 8, at 451, 446-451.
45
  Letter from Edmund Carrington to Gov. Edmund Randolph (April 2, 1787) in 9 MADISON PAPERS 362.  
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 77 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published Nov. 27, 1787).
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the states.47  It had been approved by the overwhelming majority of the states in 1781 and 
1783 defeated by selfish New York in 1783 and “obdurate” Rhode Island in 1781.48  The 
Anti-Federalists, while opposing the power of Congress to lay general internal or dry-
land taxes except by requisition upon the states, nonetheless generally conceded that 
Congress could be given the power to lay “external taxes” by the impost.49
47
  Oliver Ellsworth, Debates in the Connecticut Convention on Ratification (Jan. 7. 1788), in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 547, 549, 550.
48
  After Rhode Island vetoed the 1781 Impost proposal, Virginia withdrew her prior ratification on the 
ground that a federal tax was inconsistent with Virginia sovereignty. XI Statutes of Virginia 171 (William 
Waller Hening, ed., Oct. 1782).  Madison was appalled.  See Letter from James Madison to Edmund 
Randolph, January 22, 1783, 6 MADISON PAPERS 55-56 (saying  that “Virginia could never have cut off this 
source of public relief at a more unlucky crises”).  New York and Rhode Island, however, bore the brunt of 
the angry rhetoric. 
49 FEDERAL FARMER, LETTERS TO THE REPUBLICAN, LETTER III, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Oct. 10, 1787), 
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 30, 35-36 (saying that impost may be collected by a few officers 
in seaport towns, but opposing internal taxes); CATO UTICENIS, TO THE FREEMEN OF VIRGINIA, VIRGINIA 
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 8 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 70, 73 (conceding 
impost and allowing requisitions if imposts are not sufficient); AN OLD WHIG, LETTER VI, PHILADELPHIA 
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Nov. 24, 1787), reprinted in  14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 215, 218; BRUTUS V, 
NEW YORK JOURNAL (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in  14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 422, 426-27; Letter from 
James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 2, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 332 (saying that the 
power of taxing any thing but imports appears to be the most popular topic among the adversaries).  Two 
examples of Anti-Federalist opposition to a federal impost are James Wadsworth, Speech to the 
Connecticut Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 547 (arguing that impost is not a 
proper mode of taxation) and John Smilie, Debates in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 
28,1788), in 2 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 407, 408-409 (saying “[i]f they have unlimited power to drain the 
20
The important aspect of the controversy over New York impost was that the 
revenue was needed to pay off the Revolutionary war debts, and not just for New York 
State needs.  It was known that when the Constitution was ratified, Congress was going 
to impose the 5% federal impost, denied to it by the one-state veto rule in 1781 and 1783.  
“[W]as it not an acknowledged object of the Convention,” Madison asked, “and the 
universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the
general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general 
revenue?”50
New York Governor George Clinton was said, as the ratification debate got 
serious, to have offered New Jersey to give up the impost and refund collections if New 
Jersey would just refuse to ratify the Constitution.51  New York’s giving revenue to New 
Jersey, however, would not have improved the fiscal health of the federal government.  
The rhetorical unfairness arguments seem to be just make-weights, almost a
sweetener to convince Connecticut and New Jersey to support the federal fiscal needs.  
When the Constitution became final, Connecticut and New Jersey could expect a 
wealth of the people, whether by imposts or by direct levies, then the system is too formidable for states to 
break”)(emphasis added).  
50 THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 262 (James Madison)(first published Jan. 18, 1788).
51
  Deposition of Adam Boyd, Feb. 1789, BRUNSWICK GAZETTE (Feb. 10, 1789), DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: 
MICROFICHE SUPPL. N.J. 170 (saying that Abraham Clark had thought New Jersey had ratified too 
precipitously and that New York would have made concession including giving up the impost and 
refunding prior collections if New Jersey would decline);  PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 1787), cited 
in KAMINSKI, supra note 17, at 136 (reporting that Clinton was trying to defeat the Constitution by offering 
a “person of considerable weight” (probably Abraham Clark) that New Jersey could have half of the New 
York state impost if New Jersey would refuse to ratify.)
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doubling of the then current 2-1/2% impost on New York shipping up to the federal 5% 
and there would be no possibility of exemption from the new doubled rate impost for 
goods not landed or broken down in New York harbor.   
The controversy over nationalizing the New York and other state imposts was 
commonly called a “regulation of commerce” issue in the debates over the Constitution.  
“Regulation of commerce” was often a synonym for taxation of commerce.52  In modern 
usage, however, the impost is better called a revenue issue.  Section 8 of Article 1 also 
gives Congress the power to raise taxes on its own, including imposts, and section 10 
prohibits state imposts.  Thus the revenue issues were adequately covered elsewhere and 
did not need the commerce clause.  
2.  Retaliation Against the British. 
The largest number of the sampled cites to “regulation of commerce,” at thirty-
eight cites and 28%, refer to attempts to open up foreign ports to U.S.–owned ships by 
imposing or threatening a retaliatory impost or embargo on foreign ships coming into 
American ports.53  The core grievance was that Great Britain, under the British 
52
  Of the sample of 32 quotes on regulation of commerce being a reference to the federalizing the impost in 
supra note 15, nine of them use “regulation of commerce” to mean taxation.  
53
  (1) Report of a Committee of the Continental Congress of Gerry, Reed, Williamson, Chase and 
Jefferson (Apr. 30, 1784), in 26 JCC 313 (proposing that the legislatures of the States give Congress the 
power for 15 years to prohibit imports in a ship of a country without a commercial treaty with the United 
States); (2) Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (July 26, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 329 
(Virginia congressional delegate explains that Congress has proposed to be granted the power to regulate 
commerce to obtain reciprocity from other nations); (3) Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 
7, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 334-335 (saying “should G. B. persist in the machinations which distress 
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us and seven or eight of the States be hindered by the others from obtaining relief by federal means, … I 
tremble at the anti-federal experiments into which the former may be drawn”); (4) Letter from James 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS 500, 502 (saying that “if anything 
should reconcile Virga. to the idea of giving Cong. a power over her trade, it will be that this power is 
likely to annoy Great Br. against who the animosities of our Citizens is still strong[.]”); (5) James Madison, 
Motion in the Virginia House of Delegates (Nov. 30, 1785), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 114 (proposing to 
allow Congress to embargo or tax any foreign vessel to obtain privileges in foreign ports for U.S. vessels); 
(6) Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 502 
(saying that if the Annapolis Convention should come to nothing, it will “confirm G.B. and all the world in 
the belief that we are not to be respected, not apprehended as a nation in matters of commerce”); (7) 
Edmund Randolph, Speech before the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS 19 
(Madison Notes)(saying that among the advantages that the U. S. might acquire are “counteraction of the 
commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum—&c &c[.]”); (8) Letter from 
Philippe Andre’ Joseph de Letombe to Comte de la Luzerne (June 26, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 197 (saying that adoption of the Constitution will unite the states and facilitate the desirable 
Reciprocity of Commerce between U.S. and France); (9) Letter from James Bowdoin to George Erving 
(Aug. 12, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 324 (saying that Great Britain’s system of commerce will 
be altered when “congress under the new Constitution will have the power of regulating it within the Ports 
of the United States”); (10) John Rutledge, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 452 (saying that gaining access to the West Indies is the “great object” of  regulating 
commerce); (11) Letter from Andrew Allen to Tench Coxe (Sept. 8, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
362 (arguing that Advocates of the Constitution are too sanguine in assuming adoption will immediately 
extend Commerce or open new Channels of Trade); (12) JOHN JAY, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK 7 (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1888) (hereinafter PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION)(saying that “other nations 
taking advantage of [our] imbecility, are daily multiplying commercial restraints upon us” and that there is 
“not one English, French or a Spanish island or port in the West-Indies to which an American vessel can 
carry a cargo of flour for sale”); (13) SOCIAL COMPACT, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE (Oct. 4, 1787), reprinted in
23
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 356 (regretting the begging situation to which our commerce is reduced in 
every part of the globe, the heavy duties and the exclusions from British ports); (14) MARCUS, DAILY 
ADVERTISER, NEW YORK (Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 127 (arguing that 
when commerce is  a national object, nations will form treaties with us); (15) A LANDHOLDER I, 
CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 5-12 1787), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 399-400 (arguing that 
until the Constitution is effected, our commerce may be “insulted by every overgrown merchant in 
Europe”); (16) THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published November 24, 1787) 
(advocating a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain from all ports); (17) James 
Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 D OCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 339, 360 (saying that being devoid of importance, we were unable to command a sale for 
commodities in a foreign market); (18) A LANDHOLDER V, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 25 – Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in 3 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 480 (arguing that without the Constitution  “your 
commerce, the price of your commodities, your riches, and your safety will be the sport of every foreign 
adventurer”); (19) CANDIDUS I, (BOSTON) INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Dec. 6, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 128 (Herbert Storing, ed. 1981)(hereinafter THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST) (saying that “those nations laid these duties to promote their own fishery, &c. and … will 
pursue their own politicks respecting our imports and exports, unless we can check them by some 
commercial regulations”); (20) THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published 
December 14, 1787) (saying that the want of a power to regulate commerce operated as a bar to the 
formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers); (21) Address of the Dissent of the minority of the 
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1987), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 7, 14 (Anti-Federalists regretting 
that “we are suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations, who had shackled our commerce, while we 
were unable to retaliate”); (22) CENTINEL VI , PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 98, 99 (an Anti-Federalist opponent nonetheless finding considerable benefit in 
strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to enable them to regulate commerce and counteract the adverse 
restrictions of other nations); (23) Edmund Randolph, Reasons for not Signing the Constitution, Richmond, 
Virginia (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 260, 265 (saying that the states can not organize 
retaliation against foreign nations and what is needed is “exclusion …opposed to exclusion, and restriction 
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to restriction”); (24) Charles Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 253-54 (saying that the first great inconvenience of the Confederation was the 
“destruction of our commerce, occasioned by the restrictions of other nations, whose policy it was not in 
the power of the general government to counteract”); (25) Edward Rutledge, Debate in the South Carolina 
Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), in 2 D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 23 (asking “could [the Articles] obtain 
security for our commerce in any part of the world?”); (26) James Bowdoin, Massachusetts Ratification 
Convention (Jan. 23, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 83 (saying that trade is in a miserable state because 
other nations can prohibit our vessels from entering their ports or lay heavy duties on our exports, and we 
can not prevent it because Congress has no retaliating or regulating power over their vessels and exports); 
(27) Nathaniel Gorham, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 25, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES
106 (saying that Great Britain “prohibit[s] our oil, fish, lumber, [etc.] from being imported into their 
territories, in order to favor Nova Scotia, for they know we cannot make general retaliating laws”); (28) 
Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 13 (saying that “the navigation acts of the states of Newhampshire and Massachusetts had been 
suspended because the other states did not wish to proclaim similar ones, designed to punish England for its 
strictness against american commerce’); (29) “THE FABRICK OF FREEDOM,” A SONG BY JONATHAN 
WILLIAMS, JR., PHILADELPHIA FEDERAL GAZETTE (Mar. 8, 13, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 361 (saying in part, “See Commerce with extended hand/ Flies the restraint of kings/ And foreign 
riches to this land/ From ev’ry climate brings/”); (30) JOHN JAY, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK (Spring 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 501 (saying we should not continue “our 
present humiliating condition, to give other nations further time to perfect their restrictive systems of 
commerce, …and strengthen them by all those regulations and contrivances in which a jealous policy is 
ever fruitful”); (31) “TO BE OR NOT TO BE? IS THE QUESTION,” NEW HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (PORTSMOUTH)
(Apr. 16, 1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 407 (saying that the inconvenience that 
foreign powers must suffer from a proper regulation of commerce by congress will oblige them to open 
ports); (32) Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (May 29, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 145 (arguing that Americans are indignant that John Adams failed to get treaty of commerce so 
that their flag is excluded from trading in the West Indies); (33) DAVID RAMSAY, ORATION, CHARLESTON 
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Navigation Act, granted a monopoly to its own vessels for entry into its West Indies 
possessions in an attempt to capture the profits of shipping for its own nationals.  Great 
Britain also wanted to stimulate a strong merchant fleet that could train British seamen 
for the Navy and could serve as auxiliary vessels in war.  When the American states were 
still colonies, the purpose of giving incentives to British shipping included especially 
stimulating American shipping, and there was a very active trade between the West 
COLUMBIAN HERALD (June 5, 1787), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 163 (saying that “[o]ur 
protected commerce will open new channels for our native commodities, and give additional value to the 
soil, by increasing the demand for its productions”); (34) James Monroe, Speech to Virginia Ratification 
Convention (June 10, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 213 (Anti-Federalist saying that commercial treaties 
would be no advantage because there is no probability of opening the West or East Indies to U.S. ships); 
(35) Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (June 18, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 184 (referring to time “when foreign nations shall be disposed to give us equal advantages in 
commerce from dread of retaliation[.]”); (36) NEW JERSEY JOURNAL (June 18, 1788), reprinted in 18 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 185 (saying that “[t]he moment the English know we can retaliate, that moment 
they will relax in their restrictions on our commerce—and that moment will never arrive until our union is 
consolidated”); (37) William R. Davie, North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 18 (arguing that the United States should be empowered to compel foreign nations into 
commercial regulations and counter British insults); (38) James Madison, Preface To Debates in the 
Convention of 1787 (c. 1830), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 547 (describing the reasons for the Constitution 
to include “the want of authority in Congress to regulate Commerce, [which] had produced in Foreign 
nations particularly G.B. a monopolizing policy injurious to the trade of the U.S. and destructive to their 
navigation.”)
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Indies and American ports.  When America achieved independence, however, Britain 
decided that there was no reason to let American vessels into its West Indian ports.54
The grievance, however, was generalized to include the power to retaliate against 
France and Spain for similar exclusions.  All great trading nations were said to have tried 
“to secure to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade.”55  John Jay complained 
that because of our “imbecility,” all the empires were imposing “commercial restraints 
upon us” so that there is “not one English, French or a Spanish island or port in the West-
Indies to which an American vessel can carry a cargo of flour for sale.”56  Without a 
Constitution, proponents argued, our commerce would be “insulted by every overgrown 
merchant in Europe“57 and “your commerce, the price of your commodities, your riches, 
and your safety will be the sport of every foreign adventurer.”58  Britain’s system of 
commerce will be altered, former Governor James Bowdoin told the Massachusetts 
Ratification Convention, only when “congress under the new Constitution will have the 
54 LORD SHEFFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES 264-265 (6th ed. 1784), 
described in JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF INDEPENDENCE: NEOMERCANTILISM AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 81-83 (1993) and STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK: THE AGE OF FEDERALISM
69 (1993). 
55
  Thomas Russell, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S 
DEBATES 139.
56 JOHN JAY, ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 7 (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION.
57 A LANDHOLDER I, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 5-12 1787), reprinted in 3 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY
399-400.
58 A LANDHOLDER V, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 25 – Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 3 D OCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 480.
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power of regulating it within the Ports of the United States.”59  What was needed, said 
Edmund Randolph, is “exclusion … opposed to exclusion, and restriction to 
restriction.”60  Even the threat of retaliation, Washington wrote, would induce foreign 
powers to give the United States beneficial commercial treaties.61
A retaliatory impost or embargo required a uniform national policy for all 
American ports.  When Massachusetts had tried to impose a penalty tax on British ships 
to force open the ports of the British West Indies, other states had undercut her by 
welcoming British ships into their ports.62  For an embargo or impost to be effective, it 
59
  Letter from James Bowdoin to George Erving (Aug. 12, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 324.
60
  Edmund Randolph, Reasons for not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 D OCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 260, 265.
61
  Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (June 18, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 184 (saying that “when foreign nations shall be disposed to give us equal advantages in 
commerce from dread of retaliation.”); Letter from Philippe Andre’ Joseph de Letombe to Comte de la 
Luzerne (June 26, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 197 (saying that adoption of Constitution will 
unite the states and facilitate the desirable Reciprocity of Commerce between U.S. and France); MARCUS, 
DAILY ADVERTISER, NEW YORK (Oct. 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 127 
(arguing that when commerce is a national object, nations will form treaties with us); James Wilson, 
Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 431 (saying 
that “[d]evoid of national importance, we could not procure, for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign 
markets”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published December 14, 1787)
(saying that the want of a power to regulate commerce operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial 
treaties with foreign powers).
62
  Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 16 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 13 (saying that Massachusetts and New Hampshire had both attempted an 
exclusion of British ships to punish Britain for its strictness against American commerce, but had 
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could not be open to an easy and free end run through a neighboring state.  New York 
had tried to impose a discriminatory impost on foreign goods brought in from New Jersey 
or Connecticut in order to try to enforce New York’s retaliatory exclusions against the 
British.63  The states would clearly have to present a united front. 
Retaliation against the British exclusions was even sometimes said to be the 
primary purpose of the Constitution.  Charles Pinckney argued to the South Carolina 
House of Representatives that the first great inconvenience of the Confederation was the 
destruction of our commerce because the general government could not counteract the 
restrictions of other nations.64  Shortly before the Annapolis Convention, Madison wrote
to Jefferson that “if anything should reconcile Virga. to the idea of giving Cong. a power 
over her trade, it will be that this power is likely to annoy G.B. against whom the 
animosities of our Citizens are still strong.”65  Even staunch Anti-Federalists endorsed the 
suspended the attempt because the competing ports in other states would not join the embargo and so got 
the advantage of British ships newly attracted to their ports.)
63 JENSEN, supra note 40, at 339.  Jensen also says that the Anti-New Jersey and Connecticut imposts did 
not mean very much, however, because neither Connecticut nor New Jersey had reasonable deep water 
ports, so that running around the New York harbor was highly inconvenient.
64
  Charles Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 E LLIOT’S DEBATES
253-54.  Consistently, Professor John Crowley has said that  “[i]n the name of seeking power to regulate 
commerce, Congress really only sought authority for retaliatory Navigation Acts."  CROWLEY, supra note 
54, at 94.  
65
  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS 344.  See also 
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 502 (saying 
that “if [the Annapolis Conference] should come to nothing, it will I fear confirm G.B. and all the world in 
the belief that we are not to be respected, nor apprehended as a nation in matters of commerce”). 
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idea that the new government should be empowered to impose a retaliatory impost to 
open up the British West Indies to American ships.66
Whatever the perceived importance of the power to retaliate against the British, 
however, the proposal to retaliate came to nothing.  On the first working day of the 
Congress under the new Constitution, Madison introduced his proposal for an impost.  
His bill would raise federal revenue, but it also would have discriminated against British 
ships.  “The union by the establishment of a more effective government ,” Madison said, 
“[has] recovered from [its] state of [impotence and] imbecility, that ... prevented a 
performance of its duties.”67  Discrimination, that is, a higher impost on British ships, 
might give Great Britain a motive to enter into a commercial treaty, but even if Great 
While retaliation against the British was not the only purpose for the Constitution, it does seem to 
have been the primary focus for the Annapolis Convention, which was an important stepping stone to the 
Philadelphia convention.  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1996); NORMAN K. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800, at 257-266 
(1978).  See also RISJORD, at 251-266 for a discussion of how giving Congress the power over commerce 
contributed to the Constitutional movement in Virginia.
66
  Address of the Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1987), in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 7, 14 (regretting that “we are suffering from the restrictions of foreign nations, 
who had shackled our commerce, while we were unable to retaliate[.]”); CENTINEL VI (ANTI-FEDERALIST), 
PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 98, 99 (finding 
considerable benefit in strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to counteract the adverse restrictions of 
other nations.)
67
  James Madison, Speech Before the House of Representative (Apr. 8, 1789), in 1 A NNALS OF CONGRESS
107. See also Speech before the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1787), in 1 A NNALS OF CONGRESS 193 
(arguing we will not give Great Britain a motive for entering into a treaty unless we discriminate against 
them.) 
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Britain did not respond, Madison hoped, the discriminatory impost would move 
American commerce away from Britain into its more “natural channels,” for instance, 
France.68
The Senate, however, lead by the New York delegation, stripped the anti-British 
discrimination features from the 1789 impost bill.69  Great Britain allowed American 
ships into the British home ports without restriction or discrimination and opponents of 
retaliation feared that Britain might retaliate in turn if faced with American port 
restrictions.70  The House acceded to the Senate and Madison’s plan for discrimination 
against the British failed to be part of the enacted impost.71  As Stanley Elkins and Eric 
McKitrick put it, “Madison hardly pictured himself as a spokesman for the interests of 
68
  Speeches before the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 191, 193 
(trade with Britain is an “artificial channel” larger than natural.)  
69 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 766, n. 66 collects the evidence for the New York merchants 
opposing discrimination.  While there was no specifically anti-British discriminations, there were 
differentials in whether goods were imported in American ships, discussed in text accompanying infra
notes 138-140.
70 Editorial note, in 12 MADISON PAPERS 55; Editorial note, in 12 JEFFERSON PAPERS 521-526.  Cf. John 
Laurence, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1 A NNALS OF CONGRESS 192 
(arguing that England does not now discriminate against American vessels coming into England.)
71
  An Act for Laying Duties on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported in the United States, July 4, 
1789, 1 STAT. 24-27.  May 16 and May 26, 1789, in 1 A NNALS OF CONGRESS 365-66, 409 (5% impost 
passes but discrimination defeated.)
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American merchants.  Indeed, when merchants objected to his plan, he turned his 
hostility upon them, charging that they were unduly subservient to British influence.”72
A retaliatory impost against British shipping probably never was a good idea.  
The British were intransigent on the subject.  After independence they reviewed their 
policy and decided that allowing American ships into the British West Indies would just 
enrich a rival shipper and encourage more American ships.  Britain also rightly 
considered that it had the best and cheapest manufactured goods and gave the best credit 
on the globe so that it need not worry about Americans trying to cut off access to British 
exports, whatever their desires.73  There were also not very many British ships coming 
into American ports against which to retaliate because American shipping was on its way 
to monopolizing transatlantic shipping.  By 1796, American ships, by successful 
competition and American oak, were carrying over 90% of the transatlantic commerce.74
72 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 88.  See also id., at 432 (referring to the “ideological liability, 
that of Madison’s stubborn commitment to a system of coercive legislation against the commerce of Great 
Britain.”)
73 SHEFFIELD, at 264-265, described in ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 69-71.  Consistently, see
Letter from Andrew Allen to Tench Coxe (Sept. 8, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 362 (arguing that 
proponents of the Constitution are “too sanguine in assuming adoption will immediately extend commerce 
or open new channels of trade.”); ROBERT B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 194 
(1987)(citing a British merchant who responded to the threat of American sanctions by saying “Pish”).  
Madison, by contrast, argued that America could retaliate against Britain, because in the case of a war of 
commercial relations between the two nations, the loss to Great Britain’s commerce and manufactures 
would be severe.  James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives, June 25, 1790, 13 MADISON 
PAPERS 255, 256.
74 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 414 (93%).
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A penalty against British ships would not have been much of an economic stick, even if it 
extinguished the last of them.  Penalties would also have angered the British, perhaps into 
retaliation against American ships going into British ports.  American transatlantic 
shipping into Great Britain was important to the commercial states and America could 
not afford a prohibitory trade war with Great Britain.  The British West Indies 
prohibitions on American ships, moreover, were porous; the islands themselves were 
happy to evade the prohibitions on American trade and encourage smuggling.75  For 
Virginia, finally, leaving American vessels as the only bidders for the shipping of 
Virginia crops by excluding British ships from American ports would have raised 
shipping costs or lowered crop prices, both to the detriment of Virginia.76  Madison’s 
discriminatory impost is probably best understood as driven by ideological hatred of 
Britain, more than by any reasonable view of American self interest.77
75 See, e.g., id., at 131 (finding a treaty opening West Indies would just confirm what was already 
accessible informally.)
76 But see Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1784), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS 102-
104 (saying that he wanted regulation of trade only to reduce the trade of Great Britain to an equality with 
other nations and not to make a mercantile element rich.)
77
  See the discussion in ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 54, at 131, 375-387, 432 (arguing that Madison 
seeking the retributional impost in both 1789 and 1794 was relying on “exploded dogmas and bad 
economics” and that Madison had an “ideological liability,” i.e., a “stubborn commitment to a system of 
coercive legislation against the commerce of Great Britain.”)  
Madison and Jefferson did see retribution against the British differently.  Madison believed that 
the British would have to cave in because “the farmer can live better without the shop-keeper than the 
shop-keeper without the farmer."  James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives on Navigation 
and Trade (May 13, 1790), in 13 MADISON PAPERS 211, 213.  For Jefferson in Paris, the failure of the 
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The punitive impost cannot be given much weight to explain the Constitution, 
notwithstanding how prominently it shows up in the Constitutional debates.  The failure 
of Congress to endorse the proposal in 1789 serves as a deliberative poll of the sentiment 
of the nation, about as close to the adoption as the Constitution as we can ask for, and the 
poll was unfavorable to the retribution.  The country, when asked, did not want the 
remedy.  The retaliatory impost was plausibly a part of Madison’s thinking, and that 
alone makes it part of the cause of the Constitution, but Madison could not get a majority 
for retaliation, over opposition both in Virginia and in the shipping states.  A proposal 
that failed to pass even after it was allowable under the ratified Constitution cannot be 
used as a strong explanation of why the Constitutional revolution was needed or adopted.
3. American Mercantilism.
While the Framers objected to British restrictions requiring that only British ships 
could supply the British West Indies, they simultaneously wanted to require that 
American products could be carried only in American ships.  The commerce clause gave 
Congress the power to imitate the same British Navigation Act exclusions, objected to 
retributional impost of British shipping hurt France, which had “spent money and blood” for the American 
cause and helped Britain, which had “moved heaven, earth and hell to exterminate us.”  Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 364, 366-
367 (Julian P. Boyd, ed. 1950)(hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS).  For descriptions of the issue more 
sympathetic to Jefferson and Madison views on anti-British discrimination see Drew R. McCoy, 
Republicanism and American Foreign Policy: James Madison and the Political Economy of Commercial 
Discrimination, 1789 to 1794, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 633 (3d series 1974) and Julian Boyd, editorial note, 8 
MADISON PAPERS 64. 
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above, so as to give United States vessels exclusive monopolies on shipping American 
commodities out of United States ports (30 cites and 22%).78
78
  (1) Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 P APERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 75, 
78 (Harold C. Syrett, ed. 1961-1987)(hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS)(arguing that Dutch commercial 
regulations “are more rigid and numerous, than those of any other country; and it is by a judicious and 
unremitted vigilance of government, that they have been able to extend their traffic to a degree so much 
beyond their natural and comparative advantages”); (2) Richard Henry Lee to — (Oct. 10, 1785), 2 Letters 
389, in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 482 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987)(hereinafter 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION)(arguing that the Northern and Southern states are so different that “ the 
Staple  States should oppose the plan of vesting powers for the restraint & regulation of Commerce in 
Congress … whose Constituents are very differently circumstanced”); (3) Gouverneur Morris, Debate at 
the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 451 (Madison Notes)(opposing 
requiring two-thirds vote for the regulation of commerce because encouraging American ships and seamen 
would reduce Southern produce costs and improve security); (5) Mr. Williamson (Aug. 29, 1787), in id.
(saying that if “Northern States should push their regulations [of commerce] too far, the S. States would 
build ships for themselves”); (6) Charles Pinkney, Speech in the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 449 (saying that the interests of the Southern states were against regulation of 
commerce; but that he thought it proper to allow power of making commercial regulations because of the 
concessions that the North had made); (7) James Wilson, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 
1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 616 (Madison Notes)(saying that power to grant monopolies and 
corporations was included in the power to regulate commerce); (8) George Mason, Speech before the 
Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 616 (Madison Notes)(opposing 
monopolies and arguing that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to give 
incorporation); (9) Eldridge Gerry, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 635 (Rufus King Notes)(opposing giving Congress power to regulate commerce 
because it will enable it to “create corporations and monopolies”); (10) George Mason, Speech before the 
Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 639 (Madison Notes), 635 (King 
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Notes)(asking for a two-thirds majority for  the adoption of Navigation Acts to prevent “a few rich 
merchants” in New York, Philadelphia and Boston from monopolizing shipping and reducing the value of 
southern crops by perhaps one-half); (11) U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6 (providing that no “Preference 
shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of 
another”); (12) Letter from North Carolina Delegates to Gov. Richard Caswell (Sept. 18, 1787), in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 215, 216 (saying that “[a] navigation Act or the Power to regulate Commerce in 
the Hands of the National Government by which American Ships and Seamen may be fully employed is the 
desirable weight that is thrown into the Northern Scale”); (13) Alexander Hamilton, Conjectures About the 
New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 9 (saying the good will of the 
commercial interests throughout the states will give all its efforts to the Constitution to establish a 
government capable of regulating, protecting and extending commerce); (14) Letter from Richard Henry 
Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 28  (saying that the “Commercial 
plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious Trader”); (15) George Mason: Objections to the Constitution 
(Oct. 7, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 346, 350 (saying that by requiring only a majority to make 
all “Commercial & Navigation Laws, the five Southern States … will be ruined; [because laws] may be 
made as will enable the Merchants of the Northern & Eastern States not only to demand an exorbitant 
Freight, but to monopolize the Purchase of the Commodities at their own Price”); (16) THE LANDHOLDER 
VI, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 164 (arguing that Mason 
opposed the Constitution because “a navigation act might otherwise be passed excluding foreign bottoms 
from carrying American produce to market, and throw a monopoly of the carrying business into the hands 
of the eastern states who attend to navigation”); (17) AGRIPPA VI, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Dec. 14, 
1787), reprinted in 4 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 426, 428 (opposing Congressional power to grant exclusive 
charters because they would be “injurious to … commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying … 
rivalship”); (18) THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 27, 1787)
(praising the fostering of commerce so as to increase the circulation of precious metals, invigorate the 
channels of industry and boost government revenue); (19) AGRIPPA XIV, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Jan. 
25 1788), reprinted in 5 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 821 (saying that while a system of commerce established 
by national authority would be beneficial in some respects, still most governments establish companies that 
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have ill effects on trade and that “as we are situated at one extreme of the empire, two or three such 
companies would annihilate the importance of our seaports, by transferring the trade to Philadelphia”); (20) 
Thomas Dawes, Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 58 
(objecting that without the Constitution’s regulation of commerce, “a vessel from Roseway or Halifax finds 
as hearty a welcome with its fish and whalebone at the southern ports, as though it was built, navigated, and 
freighted from Salem or Boston”); (21) James Bowdoin, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification 
Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 129 (arguing that well being of trade depends upon the 
proper regulation of it and unregulated trade has ruined rather than enriched those who carry it on); (22) 
Thomas Russell, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S 
DEBATES 139 (arguing that Congress should confine shipping to American vessels, just as all the great 
trading nations have benefited “from securing to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade”); (23) 
Amendments to the Constitution Recommended by the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 6, 
1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 177 (recommending that Congress erect no company of merchants with 
exclusive advantages of commerce); (24) HUGH WILLIAMSON, SPEECH AT EDENTON, NORTH CAROLINA, 
NOVEMBER 8, 1787, PRINTED IN THE DAILY ADVERTISER (NEW YORK) (Feb. 25 – 27, 1788), reprinted in 2 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 227, 231 (saying that “[b]y the sundry regulations of commerce, it will be 
in the power of Government not only to collect a vast revenue for the general benefit of the nation, but to 
secure the carrying trade in the hands of citizens in preference to strangers”); (25) Letter from John Howard 
to George Thatcher (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 230 (saying that wise commercial 
regulations will reduce imports of foreign luxuries in foreign ships to one-tenth and end the current 
situation where “our own vessels are rotting in the docks, our seamen strolling the streets, and our 
merchants daily becoming bankrupt”); (26) NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 1788), 
reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 380 (saying that gentlemen of Virginia opposing the Constitution 
“fear, that a majority of the states may establish regulations of commerce which will give great advantage 
to the carrying trade of America and be a means of encouraging New England vessels rather than old 
England”); (27) Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (May 5, 1788), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 303 
(saying that “Southern or Staple States accommodated to the Northern states by allowing a Navigation Act 
giving them exclusive carrying of commodities, although Southern States would of course have lower 
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The Constitution was written long before Adam Smith, laissez faire and free trade 
came to dominate economic philosophy.79  It is not uncommon to find descriptions of the 
Constitutional document as “a part of the liberal, free trade tradition,”80 but those 
descriptions have to be understood as solely aspirational.  
Both Hamilton and Madison were mercantilists, by their participation in the 
serious thinking of the times.  Mercantilism focused on stimulating foreign exports and 
discourage foreign imports so as to maximize the domestic supply of specie.  
Mercantilism assumed that government should actively stimulate exports by giving 
freight costs if ships of every Nation may come into their ports”); (28) Letter from Richard Henry Lee to 
Edmund Pendleton (May 26, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 465 (saying that the danger of 
monopolized  trade may be avoided by requiring three-fourths of the states to approve regulations of 
commerce); (29) Alexander Hamilton, Debate in New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1788), in 2 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES 236 (saying that it was in the interest of the Northern States that “they should have full 
power, by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of 
the navigation of foreigners”); (30) John Lansing, Resolution in New York Ratification Convention (July 2, 
1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 407 (moving that “nothing in the Constitution contained shall be construed 
to authorize Congress to grant monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive advantages of 
commerce.”)
79 See, e.g., DOUGLAS IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 80 
(1996)(Adam Smith’s free trade ideas did not begin to get cited as orthodoxy among economists until at 
least a quarter century after they were published in 1776); CROWLEY, supra note 54, at xi (saying that a 
book about the influence of Smith on the American revolutionary generation would be “very short.”)
80 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
511, 527 (2000)(describing the Madisonian Constitution as very much a part of the liberal, free trade 
tradition).
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monopolies and bounties, and should also discourage imports by taxes and restriction.81
Hamilton’s argument, in Federalist 12, that stimulation of foreign trade would contribute 
to the wealth of the whole nation is a fine example of mercantilist philosophy:
The prosperity of commerce [i.e., foreign trade] is now perceived and 
acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful as well 
as the most productive source of national wealth; and has accordingly 
become a primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means 
of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the 
precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, 
[foreign trade] serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and 
to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness… .
It has been found in various countries, that in proportion as 
[foreign trade] has flourished, land has risen in value… . The ability of a 
country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the 
quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it 
circulates. Commerce [foreign trade], contributing to both these objects, 
must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the 
requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the 
Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated and 
populous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild and 
luxuriant climates.  In some parts of this territory are to be found the best 
gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering 
influence of commerce [foreign trade], that monarch can boast but slender 
revenues.82
Mercantilism as a philosophy disapproved of imports, in part because they caused 
the outflow of the precious specie that would stimulate internal exchanges.  For example, 
“Honestus,” in New York in 1785 blamed New York’s economic problems on the 
unfavorable balance of trade that drew gold and silver out of New York.  Merchants were 
the “bane and pest” of the Country, Honestus claimed, because without them, luxuries 
would not be imported in such huge volume.83  The Constitutional debates are also filled 
81 See, e.g, CROWLEY, supra note 54. at 28 (tracing the ideas back to the 14th century.)
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 73-5 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published Nov. 27, 1787). 
83 HONESTUS, NEW YORK PACKET (Mar. 27, 1785), quoted in KAMINSKI, supra note 17, at 99.  
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with moral condemnation of imported luxuries.  Federalist Tench Coxe condemned the 
“ineffectual” federal government under the Articles for its inability to control the 
“wonton consumption” of imported luxuries.84  “Devoid of national power,” James 
Wilson regretted to Pennsylvania, “we could not prohibit the extravagance of our 
importations nor could we derive a revenue from their excess.”85  “Wise commercial 
regulations,” said Federalist John Howard, “will reduce imports of foreign luxuries in 
foreign ships to one-tenth.”86  We need a controlling Union government to regulate 
commerce, George Washington wrote, to balance against the “luxury, effeminacy and 
corruption” introduced by foreign trade.87  On his inauguration in 1789, Washington was 
to wear “a great rarity” –“ a suit made from cloth woven in the United States.”88
Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution were no friendlier to imported 
luxuries.  In the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason had “descanted,” Madison tells 
84 TENCH COXE, AN ENQUIRY INTO PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A COMMERCIAL SYSTEM SHOULD BE FOUNDED
(1787)(regretting that “ineffectual and disjointed” federal government should not be able to overcome the 
“wonton” consumption of imported luxuries.)
85
  James Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES 431.
86
  Letter from John Howard to George Thatcher (Feb. 27, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 230.
87 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3 P APERS OF GW: 
CONFEDERATION SERIES 298, 299-300 (W. Abbott, ed. 1994)(hereinafter PAPERS OF GW: CS)(arguing for 
the necessity of a centralized controuling power over commerce to balance against the luxury, effiminacy 
and corruption introduced by foreign trade).
88 JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE  INDISPENSABLE MAN 214 (1969).
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us, on the necessity of restricting the “excessive consumption of foreign superfluities.”89
Patrick Henry argued to Virginia that we buy too much and make too little and that a 
mere change in government would not cure the causes.90  John Lansing opened the Anti-
Federalist opposition in the New York Ratification debate with a fine mercantilist 
diagnosis, arguing that the cause of current embarrassments is want of money arising, 
because ‘[o]n the termination of war, …  we launched into every species of extravagance, 
and imported European goods to an amount far beyond our ability to pay.”91 The French 
Counsel reported home that the New York opponents of Constitution wanted fewer 
commercial ties with Europe, which only furnishes them with “luxuries that they must do 
without to live in the simplicity that befits a newborn State.”92  The wearing of British 
machine-woven woolens was considered immoral:  “How many thousands are daily 
wearing the manufactures of Europe, when, by a little industry and frugality, they might 
wear those of their own country,” Anti-Federalist John Williams complained to New 
York.93  Mercantilism’s general espousal of frugality and disapproval of imported 
89
  George Mason, Debate in the Federal Convention (Sept. 13, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 539 
(Madison notes).
90
  Patrick Henry, Speech before the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 9, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES 157.
91
  John Lansing, Speech before the New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1787), in 2 E LLIOT’S 
DEBATES 218.
92
 Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 25, 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
190. 
93
  John Williams, Speech before the New York Ratification Convention (June 21, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S 
DEBATES 240 (calling for abandoning all the foreign commodities that “have deluged our country, which 
loaded us with debt”); See also “A CITIZEN OF DUTCHESS COUNTY”, NEW YORK PACKET (Mar. 27, 1785), 
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luxuries can, indeed, be traced back for at least the prior hundred years.94  The 
participants in the ratification debates all approved of restricting imports and keeping 
specie at home, whether they were for or against the Constitution.
Regulations of commerce included subsidies as well as restrictions.  Even Anti-
Federalists believed, in the spirit of their times, that trade “cannot flourish, unless a 
power is somewhere vested, to cherish those Branches of Commercial Intercourse which 
are favorable to the Nation, and to check those of a contrary tendency.”95   Hamilton as 
early as 1781 had argued that the Congress needed the “Power of Regulating Trade, 
comprehending a right of giving bounties and premiums by way of encouragement.”96
Mercantilism also praised government restrictions in general.  In 1782, Hamilton, 
thinking as a mercantilist, had argued in favor of active government regulation of 
commerce.  Dutch commercial regulations, he said, “are more rigid and numerous, than 
those of any other country; and it is by a judicious and unremitting vigilance of 
government, that they have been able to extend their traffic to a degree so much beyond 
quoted in KAMINSKI, supra note 17, at 99 (suggesting New York should prohibit importation of all foreign 
articles that might be made among us and impose high imposts on all imported luxuries); George Mason 
(Sept. 13, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 606 (Madison’s Notes)(advocating regulation of commerce to 
discourage foreign superfluities and to encourage American economy, frugality and manufactures).  Cf.
Rebecca Starr, Political Mobilization, 1765-1776, in JACK GREEN & J.R. POLE, THE BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 231, 238 (1991)(saying that pledge to use homespun cloth 
was a symbolic display of loyalty to the Revolutionary cause at the outset of the War.)
94 See, e.g., DOUGLAS IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE 37 (1996).
95
  Samuel Osgood and Arthur Lee, An Address from the United States in Congress Assembled, to the 
Legislatures of the several States (Aug. 31, 1786), in 31 JCC 613, 618.
96
  Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist IV (Aug. 30, 1781), in 2 HAMILTON PAPERS 669, 670.
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their natural and comparative advantages.”97  James Bowdoin argued before the 
Massachusetts Ratification Convention, consistently, that the well being of trade depends 
upon the proper regulation of it and that unregulated trade would ruin rather than enrich 
those who carry it on.98  George Washington argued that “it behoves us to place 
[commerce] in its most convenient channels, under proper regulation – freed as much as 
possible from those veins which luxury … naturally produces.”99   Hamilton denounced 
the argument that trade would regulate itself as a “wild speculative paradox[  ] … 
contrary to the sense of the most enlightened nations.”100  Madison joined in the 
enthusiasm, denouncing those who were “decoying the people into a belief that trade 
ought to be left to regulate itself.”101
In true mercantilist terms, James Madison seems to have explained the whole 
destitution of the federal level and state encroachments upon federal rights in terms of an 
absence of regulation of foreign commerce and an unfavorable balance of trade:
Another unhappy effect of the present anarchy of our commerce will be a 
continuance of the unfavorable balance on it, which by draining us of our metals 
furnishes pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money, for indulgence 
to debtors and for postponement of taxes.  In fact, most of our political errors may 
be traced up to our commercial ones, and most of moral [errors] may to our 
political [errors].”102
97
  Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 H AMILTON PAPERS 75, 78.
98
  Debate in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 129.
99
  Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 29, 1784), in 1 PAPERS OF GW: CS 239.
100
  Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 H AMILTON PAPERS 75, 76.
101
  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 102. 
102
  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 501.  In 
the passage just before the quoted one, Madison makes clear that he is complaining about the failure of the 
states to unify to achieve an enforceable embargo or retributional impost against the British.
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Even federalization of the state imposts can be explained in mercantilist terms, as 
allowing for a better suppression of imports.  The states undercut each other on impost 
tax rates to draw ships to their own ports.  Only the federal government could enforce a 
uniform rate that would produce significant revenue that would regulate imports and 
suppress them.    James Wilson, for example, told the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention the Articles of Confederation needed to be replaced because “[d]evoid of 
power, we could neither prevent the excessive importations which lately deluged the 
country, nor even raise from that excess a contribution to the public revenue.”103  Only 
high taxes on imports could suppress the corruption of wonton luxurious consumption 
that imports represented.
The federal government was prohibited from taxing exports104 and that is best 
explained by mercantilism.  A ban on federal tax of exports is not explained by fear of the 
discriminatory abuse by New York (and other commercial states) monopolizing the taxes 
from its deep water harbor at the expense of its neighbors.  Arguably, the ban on export 
taxes was just favoritism toward the South, which had the most commodities for export.  
Still, mercantilism favored exports because they would bring specie into the country, and 
a tax on exports would suppress them.  Thus the Constitutional scheme, a federal tax on 
imports, but not on exports, was consistent with the dominant economics even without 
any favoritism.
In 1789 in the new Congress, James Madison professed to be “the friend to a very 
free system of commerce” and also said that “if industry and labour are left to take their 
103
  Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 24, 1787, in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 141
104 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 5.
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own course, they will generally be directed to those objects which are the most 
productive.”105  He promptly listed as necessary exceptions, however, every program then 
even vaguely contemplated to restrict the free flow:  Congress should impose regulatory 
imposts to induce foreign ports not to exclude American ships, to encourage American 
shipping, to foster local manufacturing, to discourage consumption of disfavored goods, 
to embargo in time of war, to encourage domestic war supplies independent of foreign 
sources, and to obtain revenue.106  By the time he had finished his list, the exceptions had 
swallowed the free trade.  Indeed, given that Madison had condemned those who were 
“decoying the people into a belief that trade ought to be left to regulate itself”107 and had 
traced most of our political and moral errors to the imports that drained us of our precious 
metals,108 the surprising, the insincere part of Madison’s 1789 address to the House was 
the opening claim that he was “friend to every free system of commerce.”
Once free trade replaced mercantilism as an economic philosophy, thanks mostly 
to the work of Adam Smith, importing British woolens and other manufactured goods 
came to be seen as a wise decision to buy the highest quality goods at the best price 
abroad, rather than wasting resources doing an inferior job more expensively at home.  If 
there is one truth that economists across the political spectrum now agree on it is that the 
wealth of the nation cannot be generally improved by banning imports.109  When Adam 
105
  James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (Apr. 9, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS 69, 71.
106 Id., at 73.
107
  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 102. 
108
  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 500, 501. 
109 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 686 (15th ed. 1995) ("[T]he theory of 
comparative advantage is one of the deepest truths in all of economics.")  For a recent review of the 
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Smith took hold, importing machine-woven woolen clothing no longer looked like such a 
moral sin. 
Madison and the other proponents of the Constitution had also advocated specific 
programs in the ratification debates that were inconsistent with free trade.
a. Port Preferences.  In 1784, Madison, in the spirit of mercantilism, had 
sponsored a port bill in the Virginia Assembly, which would have required that all trade 
between Virginians and foreign parts had to be conducted out of a single Virginia port.  
By giving a monopoly or franchise to one Virginia port, Madison wanted to establish a 
Baltimore or Philadelphia in Virginia.  Madison complained that prices for Virginia 
export tobacco were 15-20% higher on the Philadelphia wharves than in Virginia.110  The 
Port monopoly would capture the premium for Virginians and encourage development of 
Virginian port facilities.  Port monopolies had been actively used by Britain to protect its 
industry and subsidize its ports.111  The port preferences have been said to be the 
economic  “centerpiece” of the Madison’s coalition out of which the Constitutional 
literature saying that while free trade and comparative advantage arguments are “not passe, [they] have lost 
their innocence,” see Paul. R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (1987).  See also 
DOUGLAS IRWIN, supra note 94, which includes discussions of where exceptions to free trade might be 
justified.
110
  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS 306, 307. 
111 See ALBERT A. GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE 1789 at 77-78, 100-106 
(1910)(stating that American iron exports had been required to go first to the port of London, while 
Carolina rice exports were allowed to by-pass Britain entirely.)
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movement arose.112  Both Thomas Jefferson113 and George Washington114 supported the 
port monopoly idea.
As the Virginia legislature considered Madison’s bill, the ports included within 
the monopoly were expanded to two, Alexandria and Norfolk, and then to four, adding 
Bermuda’s Hundred (below Richmond on the James River) and Tappahannock (below 
Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock River).  By 1786, the monopoly had been diluted to 
include 17 listed Virginia ports.115  The Virginia legislature also exempted Virginia-
owned ships from the port restrictions.116
Madison denied that he meant to sacrifice the “conveniency” of planters to 
provide incentives for merchants,117 but the monopoly nonetheless seems motivated by 
112 BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, A PLANTERS' REPUBLIC: THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE IN 
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 269 (1996).
113
  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 11, 1784), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS 127. 
114 RAGSDALE, supra note 112, at 149.
115
  Bill Restricting Foreign Vessels to Certain Ports, June 8, 1784, and editorial note, in 8 M ADISON 
PAPERS 64.  See RAGSDALE, supra note 112, at 269-272; RISJORD, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 136-137.
116 RAGSDALE, supra note 112, at 270.  Giving Virginia-owned ships an exemption from the port 
preference, while leaving other U.S.-owned ships subject to it, was a violation of the Articles of 
Confederation prohibition on a state’s imposing any tax or restriction on an out-of-state U.S. citizen that 
was not imposed on its own citizens (ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV,) and Madison told Monroe 
that that was an “erratum” that “will no doubt be rectified.”  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe 
(Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 M ADISON PAPERS 102.  Virginia ownership of deep-water ships would not have been 
material at the time, however.  
117
  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 102, 103.
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allowing the listed ports to charge a premium for shipping Virginia crops.  Plausibly, 
Virginia as a whole would not be helped by the port monopoly even if it succeeded:  The 
15-20% premium for tobacco on Philadelphia wharves was probably a price buyers were 
willing to pay for the convenience of using the well-developed wharves of a well-
protected, deep-water port.  If so, then buyers would not pay the premium for less 
convenient Virginia shallow-water docks.  Any premium available for the Virginia ports 
would then just reduce the sale price available to the planters.  Madison’s port preference, 
as Professor Risjord describes it, “was solidly grounded in mercantilist thought, if not 
common sense.”118  Madison also had an anti-British motive: he was afraid of re-
establishment of the colonial trade ties between Britain and the planters if British ships 
were to dock at the bottom of each planter’s dock119 and, once again, anti-British 
ideology seems as important as Virginia self-interest.  
George Mason hated the Virginia port restrictions.  Mason likened the port bill to 
putting a chain across the channel of Virginia’s finest rivers at just sufficient depth that 
deep-water ships could not pass over it.120  To use a current analogy, the port bill was like 
throwing a very large rock into the river at the bottom of each planter’s wharf.121  Mason 
had been an ally of Madison’s on enforcement of the British debts and he argued that 
giving foreign merchants speedy justice and honest payment of our debts would be “a 
118 Id., at 137.  CROWLEY, supra note 54, at 100 describes Madison’s approach to the port bills a bit more 
sympathetically as a “provincial mercantilist” who was trying to provide commercial incentives.
119
  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 102, 103.
120
  Protest by a “Private Citizen” against the Port Bill (Nov.-Dec.(?) 1786), in 2 P APERS OF GM 859. 
121 See, eg., Lawrence Summers, Speech before U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 10, 1999), in Federal 
Document Clearing House (saying that removing rocks from the harbor would be a good thing.)
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more effectual means of inviting foreigners to trade with us” than the port monopoly.  
Mason was not consistently laissez faire: he was in favor of high, protectionist imposts to 
subsidize industry122 and grants and bounties to subsidize industry,123 but Mason was 
right in being against port preferences.
Mason’s views prevailed in the Constitutional Convention.  The Constitutional 
text, as adopted, prohibits preferences “given by any Regulation of Commerce or 
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.”124  Madison was sorry that port 
preferences lost.  The prohibition, he told Pendleton, was “dictated by the jealousy of 
some particular States, and was inserted pretty late in the Session.”125  The Constitution 
thus prohibited what had been a “centerpiece” or least a core concrete example of what 
Madison had in mind in the Virginia legislature under regulation of commerce.  While 
giving port preferences was a purpose for the Constitutional movement in Virginia, it was 
not a purpose that survived into the Constitutional document itself.  
b.  An American Navigation Act.  The proponents of the Constitution objected to 
the  British excluding American ships from the British West Indies, under the British 
122
  George Mason, Debate in the Federal Convention (Aug. 28, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 441 
(arguing for allowing states to impose imposts with the consent of the Congress so as to protect local 
manufacturing.)
123
  George Mason (Sept. 13, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 606 (Madison notes)(advocating association 
to discourage foreign superfluities and to encourage American economy, frugality and manufactures.)
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6.  See Mssrs. Caroll and Luther Martin (Aug. 25, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S 
RECORDS 417 (Madison Notes)(arguing that Congress might enact port preferences, requiring “vessels 
belonging or bound to Baltimore, to enter and clear at Norfolk [Virginia].”)
125
  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 28, 1787), in 10 MADISON PAPERS 223.
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Navigation Act, but they simultaneously wanted an American Navigation Act to exclude 
British ships in American ports and to give American vessels a monopoly on carrying 
American commodities.  In the Massachusetts ratification convention, for example, 
Thomas Russell argued all the great trading nations had benefited “from securing to 
themselves the advantages of their carrying trade” and he argued that Congress should 
confine American shipping to American vessels.126  Rhode Island was Anti-Federal, 
stingy in giving revenue to the federal government, but it was also a shipping state and so 
it had no trouble giving Congress the power to prohibit the importation of all foreign 
goods in any but American Vessels.127  In North Carolina, Hugh Williamson argued that 
regulation of commerce would allow the Government “to secure the carrying trade in the 
hands of citizens in preference to strangers.”128  Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania 
argued to the Philadelphia Convention that an American Navigation Act, requiring only 
American vessels for American exports and imports, would encourage American ships 
and American seamen, and that that would ultimately reduce costs of transporting 
Southern produce and improve security.129
126
  Thomas Russell, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S 
DEBATES 139.
127
  Report of the Secretary of the Congress, January 3, 1786, in 30 JCC  8, 10 (Rhode lsland ratifies the 
1783 impost subject to a substantial list of self-serving conditions, but agrees to ratify any Article 
empowering Congress “to regulate, restrain, or prohibit the importation of all foreign goods in any but 
American Vessels”).
128 HUGH WILLIAMSON, SPEECH AT EDENTON, NORTH CAROLINA (NOV. 8, 1787), REPRINTED IN THE DAILY 
ADVERTISER (NEW YORK) (Feb. 25 – 27, 1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 231.
129
  Gouverneur Morris, Debate at the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 450.  
See also Letter from North Carolina Delegates to Gov. Richard Caswell (Sept. 18, 1787), in 13 
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Going back into the Revolutionary War period, the British Navigation Act 
restrictions on trade had actually been quite popular in America, when American 
suppliers were beneficiaries inside the monopoly restrictions.130  In 1774 as the War drew 
nearer, the Continental Congress had denied that the British had the right to raise revenue 
from the Colonies, without the consent of the Colonies, but the Congress had 
simultaneously “cheerfully consented” that Parliament could secure the benefits of 
regulating commerce for both the mother country and colonies, including by taxes that 
channeled commerce.131  The Framers were, apparently, not against a Navigation Act in 
principle, but only against being outside the protection and excluded from the West 
Indies by the monopoly of the British Navigation Act. 
In the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason opposed giving Congress the 
power to enact commercial or navigation restrictions by simple majority vote.  Mason 
argued that with a Navigation Act, “a few rich merchants” in New York, Philadelphia and 
Boston could monopolize shipping and reduce the value of southern crops by perhaps 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 215, 216 (saying that “[a] navigation Act or the Power to regulate Commerce in 
the Hands of the National Government by which American Ships and Seamen may be fully employed is the 
desirable weight that is thrown into the Northern Scale.”)
130 OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS and the American Revolution 290-300 (1951)(saying 
that the Navigation Act was not the cause of the Revolution and was even quite popular).   
Larry Sawers, The Navigation Acts Revisited, 45 Econ. HiSTORY REV. 262 (1992)  reviews the 
economic history literature finding Navigation Act had trivial adverse impact and argues, contrarily, that 
Navigation Act was going to hurt key American industries substantially after 1774.  The Continental 
Congress’ “cheerful consent” to the British Navigation Act, thus, might have hidden some darker future 
clouds.
131
  October 14, 1774, in 1 JCC 69.
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one-half.132  The Southern states would be ruined, Mason would argue, because 
commercial laws would enable “the Merchants of the Northern & Eastern States not only 
to demand an exorbitant Freight, but to monopolize the Purchase of the Commodities at 
their own Price.”133  The French Consul in Wilmington, North Carolina reported home 
the view, fair to Mason’s viewpoint, that the new constitution was all to the advantage of 
the northern shipping states because they could raise shipping prices.134  Bboth Edmund 
Randolph and George Mason came out of the Convention citing the possibility of a 
navigation act as a reason why they refused to sign the Constitution.135  Soon after the 
Convention broke,  Richard Henry Lee had complained that the “Commercial plunder of 
132
  George Mason, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 631 
(Madison notes).  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina had proposed in the Convention that 
Congress should have to have a two-thirds majority for any regulation of commerce or navigation act, but 
his motion was defeated, four states in favor and seven against.  August 29, 1787, in 2 F ARRAND’S 
RECORDS 450, 453.  The Committee of Detail, chaired by John Rutledge of South Carolina had also 
required a two-thirds majority for a navigation act (2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 183 (Article VII, section 6 of 
the Committee of Detail draft)), but that provision both appeared and disappeared without an explanation.  
133
  George Mason: Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 346, 350.
134
  Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de la Luzerne (Feb. 2, 1788), in 16 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 13.  
135
  Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker Of The Virginia House Of Delegates (Oct. 10. 1787), in 3 
FARRAND’S RECORDS 127 (citing the power to regulate commerce without two-thirds majority as reason 
not to sign); George Mason (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 639-640 (Mason Notes)(majority 
vote allows Northern merchants to demand exorbitant rate, but two-thirds vote requirement will produce 
mutual moderation.)
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the South stimulates the rapacious Trader.”136 Opposition to “corporations and 
monopolies,” more generally, was a recurring theme among Anti-Federalist opponents to 
the Constitution.137
The demand for a two- thirds vote requirement for the regulation of commerce did 
not succeed and the opposition to commercial monopolies did not prevent ratification, 
but, on the other side of the coin, nothing much came of the suggestion for adoption of an 
American Navigation Act either.  The Constitution itself cut the heart out of the idea for 
an American Navigation act by prohibiting Congress from imposing any tax on 
exports.138  The prohibition on export tax meant that Congress could not give a 
differential tax advantage to American ships in the carrying of Southern commodities.  
136
 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 28.
137 See, e.g., Eldridge Gerry, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS 635 (Rufus King Notes) (opposing giving Congress power to regulate commerce because it will 
enable it “create corporations and monopolies”); AGRIPPA VI, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Dec. 14, 1787), 
reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 428 (opposing Congressional power to grant exclusive charters 
because they would be injurious to commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying rivalship); AGRIPPA 
XIV, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Jan. 25 1788), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 821 (saying that 
two or three monopoly charters in navigation would annihilate the importance of our seaports, by 
transferring the trade to Philadelphia.”); John Lansing, Resolution in New York Ratification Convention 
(July 2, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 407 (moving that “nothing in the Constitution contained shall be 
construed to authorize Congress to grant monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive advantages of 
commerce.”)  See also NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 1788), reprinted in 16 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 380 (saying that gentlemen of Virginia opposing the Constitution “fear, that a 
majority of the states may establish regulations of commerce which will give great advantage to the 
carrying trade of America and be a means of encouraging New England vessels rather than old England.”)
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9 cl. 5.
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Congress would have had to take the far more radical step of banning foreign ships from 
carrying U.S. exports entirely and Congress never seriously considered a complete 
prohibition.  
On the import side, where tax was allowed, Congress did discriminate some 
against imports on foreign ships.  The first tonnage fees imposed a tax of 6 cents per ton 
on U.S.-owned ships, but 50 cents per ton on foreign-owned ships.139  In 1790, Congress 
adopted a discriminatory 10% tax rate on imports coming in on foreign ships, while 
allowing a base line tax at only 5% for imports coming in on United States ships.140  The 
discrimination was gutted by the Jay Treaty of 1786 with Great Britain, however, which 
obligated the United States and Great Britain to stop putting higher taxes on each other’s 
ships,141 and it seems to have been ended generally in 1799 when general impost rates 
were raised to 10%.142
139
  An Act for imposing duties on tonnage, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (July 20, 1789) renewed, 
An Act imposing duties on the tonnage of ships or vessels, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 135 (July 30, 1790).  
140
  Where scheduled taxes, e.g., on Madeira, exceeded 10%, the tax on foreign-ship imports did not add on 
to the impost.  An Act for the future provision for the payment of the debt of the United States, ch. 34 , §2, 
1st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Stat. 181 (Aug. 10, 1790).  See also An Act for laying a Duty on Goods, Wares and 
Merchandise imported into the United States, ch. 2, §5, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Stat. 27 (July 4, 1789) 
(reducing tax by one-tenth, generally from 5% to 4-1/2%, tax on imports if the imports were carried in on 
U.S. ships).  
141
  Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation [Jay Treaty], Art. III, XV (concluded Nov. 124, 1794, 
ratified Feb. 1795, and promulgated Feb. 29, 1796), in SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN 
COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 333-34 (1921). 
142
  An Act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage, ch. 22, §61 (March 2, 
1799)(imposing tax of 10% of cost).  Imports from beyond the Cape of Good Hope were taxed at 20% of 
54
The discriminatory tonnage fees and the extra 5% tax on imports in foreign 
owned ships from 1789-1799 are not nothing, but they are much less than what the 
Federalists were calling for in advocating the Constitution.   Without tax on exports, the 
restriction on non-U.S. ships for American commodities had to be a total ban or nothing 
and given the options, the country ultimately chose nothing as to the American 
commodities.  The call for monopoly turned out, after deliberation, not to have majority 
support.  Giving a monopoly to American-owned vessels probably would have induced 
Britain and, indeed France as well, to reciprocate with exclusions of American ships from 
their home ports and that would have been disastrous for American shipping that was 
supposed to be the beneficiary of an American Navigation Act.  Again, the argument 
seems overwhelming that proposals that came to naught after deliberation by reason of 
insufficient support, even once permitted, do not provide significant help in explaining 
why we had the Constitutional revolution.
4.  Miscellaneous Deep Water Shipping.
There are also nine other uses of “commerce” or “regulation of commerce” where 
deep water shipping is the clear reference, but with a completely different kind of remedy 
or with no remedy specified.143  A writer named “Philadelphiensis,” for instance, argued 
cost (id.), presumably because they would have a far larger mark up than imports, e.g., from Europe, and 
the statute was using cost as an estimate of value. 
143
  (1) Francis Hopkinson: An Ode, Philadelphia (July 4 1787), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 247, 
(“Commerce her pond’rous anchor weigh/ Wide spread her sails/And in far distant seas her flag display”); 
(2) James Madison, Speech at the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 625 
(saying that whether states were to be denied power to lay harbor taxes called “tonnage” depends on scope 
of power to regulate commerce); (3) PHILADELPHIENSIS VII, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER
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that “if we mean to be a commercial people, we must endeavor to have a navy.”144
Edmund Randolph told Virginia that if the state failed to ratify the Constitution, then 
France to collect its debt would seize ships and lay waste to Virginia’s shores, destroying 
what little “commerce” Virginia had. 145  In two cites “commerce” is defined as what 
“merchants” do,146 and “merchants” seems to refer to only the deep-water importers, and 
(Jan. 10 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 338 (saying that “if we mean to be a commercial 
people, we must endeavor to have a navy”); (4) Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Ratification 
Convention (June 6, 1788), in 3 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 74 (arguing that that if Virginia failed to join the 
Constitution, then France to collect its debts could destroy what little commerce Virginia had, seizing ships 
and laying waste to Virginia shores); (5) Alexander Hamilton, Debate in the New York Ratification 
Convention (June 25, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 350 (saying that the objects of the federal government 
include “the regulation of commerce, — that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse”); (6) James 
Madison, Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 11, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 250 (saying 
that if America can solve its present impotence, it could profit from carrying the commerce of nations at 
war); (7) Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (June 25, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 190 (saying that New York Antifederalists do not want to involve themselves in commercial ties 
with Europe, “which only furnish them with luxuries that they must do without to live in simplicity.”).  
Cites (8) and (9) are found in infra note 146
144 PHILADELPHIENSIS VII, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Jan. 10 1788), reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 338.
145
  Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES 74. 
146
  (8)  THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 217 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published January 5, 1788) (saying that 
in a country of small commercial capital, a merchant is often under a necessity of keeping prices down, in 
order to effect a more expeditious sale); (9)  Amendments to the Constitution Recommended by the 
Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 177 (recommending that 
Congress erect no company of merchants with exclusive advantages of commerce).
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not to the country or retail storekeepers.147  When tax issues (35 cites), mercantilist 
restrictions (68 cites) and miscellaneous (9 cites) are combined, deep-water shipping is 
the reference in 112 or 82% of the cites.  “Commerce” within the Constitutional debates 
referred primarily to Atlantic Ocean shipping.
There is one odd-man-out quote, on land but at the border, referring to the border 
fur trade.  The French consulate wrote home in French saying that the Constitution would 
induce the British to leave the frontier posts, in conformity with the Treaty of Paris, and 
that would leave commerce in furs almost exclusively to the United States.148    The 
reference might be to the trapping of furs, akin to manufacturing, or to trade with the 
Indians.   It seems also to reflect an especially French perspective given that French 
North American empire had been active in fur trading.  The reference, however, is surely 
is not a reference to deep water shipping.
B.  Fairness between States.
147 See, e.g., Robert Morris, Report of the Office of Finance, July 29, 1782, in 22 JCC 432 (Aug. 5, 
1782)(saying that this country has always worked off of credit: “The Merchants in Europe trusted those of 
America. The American Merchants trusted the Country Storekeepers, and they the People at large.”); 
George Mason, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 639-640 
(Mason Notes)(saying that two-thirds vote requirement will produce mutual moderation between North and 
South).  Accord, GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 66  (1992)(arguing 
that in colonial times “merchants” were only the big importers).  Country storekeepers might keep 
“merchandise” under these definitions but they are not “merchants.”
148
  Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (May 29, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 145   
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Coastal shipping or other trade between the states shows up in only 23 or 17% of 
the sampled quotes, and for many of those there is no remedy attached.149   A subset of 13 
uses of “commerce” refers to trading between the states150  and a subset of 10 justifies 
other enumerated restrictions on state abuses by calling them “commerce issues.”
149
  The percentages within the sample have only a suggestive power as to how important the issues were 
relative to each other.  Number of cites is not an indication of intensity of feeling, as indicated for instance 
by the fact that three of the four most mentioned programs never got close to enactment.  
150
  (1) MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (July 8, 1787), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 391 (saying 
that when the government can pay its debts “[e]ven the circulation of the interest may become a national 
blessing, by increasing the means for commerce”);  (2) Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to 
Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 352 (arguing that restrictions on state 
debtor relief legislation was thought necessary as a security to commerce, in which the interest of 
foreigners as well as the citizens of different states may be affected); (3) James Wilson, Pennsylvania 
Ratification Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 E LLIOT’S DEBATES 497 (complaining that merchants will tell 
you that they can trust their correspondents without law; but they cannot trust the laws of the state in which 
their correspondents live); (4) THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton)(first published 
December 14, 1787) (arguing that if the Constitution is not ratified, states will impose tolls on inter-state 
transportation as the German states do on their rivers); (5) AGRIPPA VIII, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Dec. 
25, 1787), reprinted in 5 D OCUMENTARY HISTORY 515, 516 (saying that commerce between diverse states 
is “the bond of union” among the states); (6)  Governor Edmund Randolph’s Reasons for not Signing the 
Constitution, Richmond, Virginia (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 602 (saying that 
general government needs to the supreme arbiter for adjusting contention among the states, especially in 
commerce, which probably creates greatest discord); (7) THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 217 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (first published January 5, 1788) (saying that in a country of small commercial capital, a 
merchant is often under a necessity of keeping prices down, in order to effect a more expeditious sale); (8) 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (first published January 22, 1788) (saying that a defect of 
power in the existing Confederacy is the power to regulate the commerce between its several members); (9) 
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1. Tolls on Interstate Commerce?
It has been said that creation of a common market allowing free trade within the 
states was the purpose or at least a primary cause of the Constitution.  In 1824, Justice 
William Johnson argued that “[i]f there was any one object riding over every other in the 
adoption of the constitution, it was to keep commercial intercourse among the states free 
from all invidious and partial restraints.”151  To this day it is commonly echoed that the 
NEWPORT HERALD (Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 512 (complaining that 
Virginia’s January 1788 impost imposed prohibitive rates on American goods and commodities); (10) 
PUBLICOLA: ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA (Mar. 
27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 495 (saying that if North Carolina does not ratify, the 
United States will treat us as foreigners, and will preclude us from all commerce with them and annihilate 
our trade); (11) Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 985 (saying that the commercial regulations between us and Maryland have prevented reprisals 
on each other); (12) PHOCION, UNITED STATES CHRONICLE (PROVIDENCE, R.I.) (July 17, 1788), reprinted 
in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 529 (saying that if we should join the new Confederacy, our former 
inland commerce will be restored); (13) James Madison, “Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787” 
(circa 1830s), in 3 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 548 (saying that Connecticut has taxed imports from 
Massachusetts higher than imports from Great Britain and some states’ Navigation laws have “treated the 
Citizens of other States as aliens.”)
151
  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 231 (1824)(William Johnson, J. concurring).  Justice Johnson 
also described the regulation of commerce as the "immediate cause of the Constitution." Id., at 224.  Many 
of Justice Johnson’s cites are to arguments surrounding the Articles of Confederation, which included a 
mandate that states not discriminate against out-of-state Americans.  As noted in the text that follows, 
Justice Johnson’s comments are not a fair description of the effect of the Constitution, but they are a fair 
description of a movement for nationalization and against balkanization of the states, which includes the 
adoption of the Articles. 
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major purpose of the Constitution was to prevent protectionist economic policies among 
the states and to establish a common market with free trade across state borders.152
Reducing barriers on inter-state trade, however, was not an important part of the 
Constitutional debates.  The major reason why not is that the goal had already been 
mostly achieved and was not challenged.  The Articles of Confederation had already 
prohibited any state from imposing a “duty, imposition or restriction" on any out-of-state 
152
 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533, 535 (1949)(saying that a “chief occasion” of 
the commerce clause was “the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs 
barriers and other economic retaliation” and that the sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the 
movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was to allow Congress to examine the trade of the 
states and consider a uniform system of commercial regulation); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1698 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)(describing the dormant commerce clause 
as patrolling an American "common market" premised on the economic  interdependence of the states); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (same); Hunt v. Washington State 
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (same); seee Patrick Garry, Commerce Power, 
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 167 (Kermit Hall, ed. 1992) (saying 
that a “strong impetus for calling the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the need for national controls 
over the nation’s commerce which had become chaotic as many states had erected barriers to interstate 
trade in an effect to protect business enterprise for its own citizens);  Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Justice 
Scalia and Facial Discrimination: Some Notes on Legal Reasoning, 18 VA. TAX REV. 103, 108 (1998) 
(arguing that the Articles of Confederation had been unable to stem disruptive protectionism among the 
several states, thus threatening the life of the infant republic); Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as 
Industrial Policy:  Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1323-24  (1995) 
(describing the desire to break down interstate trade barriers as the impetus to political union created by the 
Constitution)..
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citizens that it did not impose on its own inhabitants.153  The states seem to have followed 
the norm well enough that the issue did not make it among the issues the debaters were 
most concerned about.  Protecting out-of-state individuals against abuse or discrimination 
was an established and important norm in the debates, but the norm shows up almost 
entirely in issues other than inter-state barriers.  As one superb review of the evidence put 
it, “the thing that strikes one’s attention in seeking reference to interstate commerce is 
their paucity.”154
Consistently, when Madison recorded the Convention’s agreeing to the commerce 
clause, without discussion or opposition, on August 16, 1787, he described the clause as 
the “[c]lause for regulating commerce with foreign nation and &c.”  Regulation of 
commerce among the states shows up only within the “&c.”   
In retrospect over 40 years later, moreover, Madison said that the "power to 
regulate commerce among the several States" arose solely to prevent the commercial 
deep-water-harbor states (e.g., New York) from abusing their power by taxing the non-
commercial states (e.g., Connecticut and New Jersey). 155   Federalization of the impost is 
not the only issue that shows up under inter-state commerce in the original debates, but 
since none of the mercantilist restrictions were adopted, the impost is the only issue with 
any continuing importance.   If regulation of commerce is (mostly) synonymous with 
153 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (providing that the people of each State shall have free ingress 
and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein “all the privileges of trade and commerce, 
subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively").
154
  Abel, supra note 8, at 470.
155
  Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 478.
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federalization of the state imposts, then there is no (significant) room in it for programs 
addressing tolls or trade barriers between the states.
The Federalists did use the specter of trade barriers to scare voters toward 
ratification of the Constitution.  There are two cites in the sample arguing that if the 
Constitution is not ratified, then duties will arise on interstate commerce:  In Federalist 
No. 22, Hamilton argued that if the Constitution were not ratified, the various states 
would impose multiple duties on inter-state transportation, much as the separate German 
states imposed tolls on the great rivers that flow through Germany.156  “Publicola” 
speaking in North Carolina argued that if North Carolina did not ratify, then the other 
states would “treat us as foreigners” and preclude commerce with them or impose 
imposts that would annihilate our trade.157  Rhode Island ratified the Constitution in 1790 
in large part in reaction to the very real threat of facing an impost or embargo on goods 
going from Rhode Island to any of the states of the Union.158  The impetus of the 
complaints, however, is not to the barriers under the Articles, but rather as a threat of 
what might happen if the unity of the United States falls apart.  Hamilton’s example of 
156 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published December 14, 1787).
157 PUBLICOLA:  ADDRESS TO THE FREEMEN OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATE GAZETTE OF NORTH CAROLINA
(Mar. 27, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 495.
158 Bruce Ackerman & Neal Kumar Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62  U.  CHI. L. REV. 475, 538  
(1995) (attributing Rhode Island’s ratification heavily to Senate passed bill that would prohibit Rhode 
Island ships in American harbors and American ships in Rhode Island harbors); John Page (Va. Federalist 
later Republican); John P. Kaminski, Rhode Island: Protecting State Interests, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION at 385 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch, eds. 1989)(same);  Speech to the 
House of Representatives (May 26, 1790), in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1673 (opposing Senate passed bill 
that would embargo all goods coming from Rhode Island).  
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inter-state barriers came from the German empire, not here.159  Tolls on inter-state 
commerce would require not just a failure to ratify the Constitution, under Hamilton’s 
argument, but also a repeal of the Articles of Confederation prohibition on interstate 
barriers, as well as an over-riding of the “genius of the American people.” 
Consistent with the norm and with the mandate of the Articles, the state imposts 
seem almost always to have exempted American source goods from tax.160 The New 
York impost that was a major irritant to its neighbors exempted goods and merchandise 
of the growth and manufacture of the United States.161  The Pennsylvania impost, which 
also drained New Jersey, also had an exemption for goods of the “growth, produce or 
manufacture of the United States or any of them.”162  The Massachusetts impost did the 
same.163
There were violations of the norm.  Before 1788, Virginia had had a 1% impost 
on goods from “any port or place whatsoever.”164  Virginia also did not exempt vessels 
159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published December 14, 1787).
160 FORREST MCDONALD, NOUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 18 
(1985)(saying sister states were exempted from restrictions against foreigners); Kitch, supra note 42, at 18-
19 (saying the only example of a discriminatory state tax was New York’s attempt to prevent end runs 
around its anti-British tax); William Frank Zarnow, New York Tariff Policies, 1775-1789, 37 New York 
History: Proceedings of the New York Historical Association 40, 47 (1956)(New York exemptions).
161
  1 Laws of the State of NY (1774-84), March 22, 1784, p. 599, ch x, II.
162
  Act of December 23, 1780, ch. 190, section 21, First Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 427 
(1984).
163
  Act and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1783, ch. 12, p. 17.
164
  11 HENNINGS STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, ch. 38, §14 p. 70 (1781).
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from other states from its tonnage fees—the user fee’s for the harbor maintenance.165 In 
1788, Virginia was shamed into adopting the usual exemption for American-source 
goods, and it also raised the rate of tax to 3% at the same time.166  A Rhode Island 
newspaper complained that Virginia’s impost imposed prohibitive rates on American 
goods,167 although by the time of the report, Virginia had both tripled her impost from 
1% to 3% and given all goods of American grown or manufacture an exemption.  Prior to 
the 1788 revision, the Virginia 1% tax is a violation of the normal rule that goods of 
American growth or manufacturer should not bear state impost, and it seems to be the 
most serious violation.
New York had tried to prevent end-runs around its impost on foreign imports by 
imposing tax, at four times the normal rate, on foreign-source goods coming into New 
York from Connecticut and New Jersey.168 The target is smuggled foreign imports, 
however, and not goods grown or made in Connecticut or New Jersey.  New York had 
the normal exemption for American source goods.  Since neither neighbor had a deep-
water port, the tax at issue would have affected smugglers who unloaded the deep water 
vessels offshore onto small boats.  Given that it was only a 2-1/2% impost that was being 
avoided, and that New York harbor was very convenient, the New York penalty tax (at 
165
  11 HENNINGS STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, ch. 8, §8 p. 121-122 (1781).
166
  12 HENNINGS STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, ch. 1, §5 p. 416 (1788).
167 NEWPORT HERALD (Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 512 (complaining that 
Virginia’s January 1788 impost imposed prohibitive rates on American goods and commodities.)
168
  1 Laws of the State of NY (1774-84), March 22, 1784, p. 599, ch x, II.  See Kitch, supra note 42, at 18-
19 for a description of the controversy. 
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10%) on foreign goods coming in from its neighbors could not have been very important.  
Most shippers would have used the New York docks and paid its fees. 
Madison in the1830s said that he understood that Connecticut taxed imports from 
Massachusetts higher than imports from Great Britain and that some states’ Navigation 
laws have treated the Citizens of other states as aliens,169  but if so, there is no evidence 
of it in the 1787 contemporaneous debates.
Still, all of the violations of nondiscrimination seem to be not very important 
exceptions.  The 1% Virginia pre-1788 impost seems to be as bad as they get.  Even 
today, moreover, state discrimination against out of state citizens remains a considerable 
problem.  State legislators are always looking for ways to protect the in-state citizens who 
elect them and to tax or restrict the out-of-state citizens who do not.170  The pre-
Constitution situation, thus, should not be judged from the norm of perfect 
nondiscrimination.  Albert Abel’s conclusion that there is a “paucity” of references to 
169
  James Madison, “Preface To Debates in the Convention of 1787” (circa 1830s), in 3 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS 547. 
170
  For a review of the legal literature on restraining state discrimination against out-of-state citizens, see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §6-2, 1029-1043 (3d ed. 2000).  Compare Richard 
Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988)(defending the need of 
the course to prevent discrimination and to protect economic union) with Luisa Heimzeling, The 
Commercial Clause, 1995 SUP. CRT. REV. 217, 22 (expressing skepticism that the dormant commerce 
clause serves efficiency, democracy or national union) and Kitch, supra note 42 (arguing that the states 
bluff and posture and try to improve their position but in the long run free trade policies would inevitably 
have triumphed by negotiation by the states and without the warping interference from the federal 
government).
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interstate trade in the Constitutional debates he looked at holds true in this 168 cite 
sample.
2. Fairness to Out-of -State Citizens Reflected Outside the Commerce Clause
Condemnation of a state’s discrimination against out-of-state citizens was 
strongly felt at the time, but the norm shows up in the constitutional debates mostly on 
issues besides the (phantom) tolls on inter-state commerce.  The anti-discrimination norm 
was commonly used to justify goals, accomplished in the text of the Constitution outside 
of the commerce clause.  The Constitution nationalized the state imposts, for example, 
relying in part on the argument that the state imposts under the Confederation allowed the 
states with good deep water harbors—and especially New York—to tax their 
uncommercial neighbors.171  The Constitution, similarly, prohibited export taxes to 
171 THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 17, 1787) (saying that some 
states–e.g. New York–have the opportunity of rendering others-Connecticut and New Jersey–tributary to 
them through commercial regulations by laying duties on importations); Letter from Timothy Pickering to 
John Pickering (Dec. 29, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 177 (attacking New York because it put 
into her own treasury all the duties arising on the goods consumed in Connecticut, New Jersey, Vermont 
and western Massachusetts); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (first published January 22,
1788) (saying that power to regulate commerce between the states was adopted to prevent commercial 
states from collecting improper and unfair contributions from their noncommercial neighbors); Letter from 
James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 478 (saying that power to 
regulate commerce grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, 
and was intended as preventative provision against injustice among the States themselves); James Madison,
“Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787” (circa 1830), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS 542 (listing as 
cause of the Constitution that some of the States had no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were 
subject to be taxed by their neighbors, through whose ports, their commerce was carried on.  “New Jersey, 
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prevent the deep-water-harbor “commercial” states from taxing export goods produced in 
neighboring “uncommercial” states.172  The Constitution prohibits “preference to the 
ports of one state over those of another,”173 because such port preferences would affect 
the States unevenly.174
Consistently, the Constitution’s adoption of protection for creditors’ rights was 
justified in part in terms of justice across state lines.  The Constitution, in article I, section 
9, prohibits states from impairing contracts and from issuing paper money, and in the 
Constitutional debates, those prohibitions were said to be necessary to prevent  
placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened to a Cask tapped at both ends.”); id., at 547 
(saying that Rhode Island was well known to have been swayed by “an obdurate adherence to an advantage 
which her position gave her of taxing her neighbors through their consumption of imported supplies.”)
172
  Gouverneur Morris, Speech in the Federal Convention (Aug. 21,1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 360 
(Madison Notes)(arguing that without prohibition on state export taxes, deep-water harbor States will tax 
the produce of their uncommercial neighbors); James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 
1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 307 (Madison Notes)(opposing prohibition on tax on exports but 
dwelling on the “injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c any longer subject to the 
exactions of their commercial neighbours”); Roger Sherman, Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 16, 
1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 308 (Madison Notes)(supporting prohibition of tax on exports, but saying 
that the oppression of the uncommercial States by commercial states was guarded against by the power to 
regulate trade between the States.)
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 6.
174 Charles Pinckney, Speech in the House of Representatives, 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1318 (Feb. 14, 1820) (arguing that congressional power over inter-state commerce by water between 
the states was given to prevent, among other things, port preferences).
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aggressions on the rights of other States” 175 and “injury to the citizens of other States.”176
Commerce in North Carolina, William Davie claimed, has been ruined by iniquitous laws 
that discourage industry by legalizing “the payment of just debts by paper, which 
represents nothing, or property of very trivial value.”177  Wicked Rhode Island had 
attempted to require out-of-state creditors to accept Rhode Island dollars, worth twenty 
cents on the dollar, as if they were worth face value.178   Paper money was a trick, 
Governeur Morris explained, “by which Citizens of other States may be affected.”179
Other prohibitions on state debtor relief were similarly thought necessary as a 
security to commerce against abuse by the states, stated Roger Sherman and Oliver 
Ellsworth, in that the “interest of citizens of different states may be effected.”180
Merchants could trust their local correspondents in other states, James Wilson told 
Pennsylvania, but they could not trust their property to the laws of the state in which their 
175
  James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS 
350. 
176 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (first published January 25, 1788)  (arguing if states 
were given the power to issue money “the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective 
alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured; and animosities 
kindled among the States themselves”).
177
 William R. Davie, North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 20.
178 IRVING POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION, 1774-1795, at 179 (1969).
179
  Gouverneur Morris (July 17, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 26 (Madison Notes).
180
  Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 352. 
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correspondents live.181  Similarly, federal courts were given judicial power over suits 
between citizens of different states, Madison told Virginia, to favor the commercial states 
by allowing creditors to avoid state courts, where the creditor remedies might be 
“imaginary and nominal.” 182
“Commerce” between or within the states was also used to justify other federal 
powers enumerated the Constitution’s description of federal powers.  In the Ratification 
debates, for instance, The Federalist referred to the coining of money and to federal 
bankruptcy law183 as “commerce” issues.   Hamilton said that the Coinage and regulation 
of weights and measures, allowed by clause 4 of Article I, section 8, were appropriate 
federal powers, just as the King of England had such powers as the “arbiter of 
commerce.”184 For the national powers allowed elsewhere, however, the commerce 
clause is not carrying any extra weight.
The norm of justice among the states was also cited in failed attempts to defeat  
provisions that the Constitution in fact adopted.  The Constitution allows Congress to 
181
  James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 E LLIOT’S 
DEBATES 492. 
182
  James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 20 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES
534, 535.
183 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 287 (James Madison) (first published January 22, 1788) (saying that “[t]he 
power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy [is properly federal because it] is so intimately connected 
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may 
lie or be removed into different States… .”)
184 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published March 14, 1788) (saying that the 
King of England in his capacity as “the arbiter of commerce” can establish markets and fairs, regulate 
weights and measures, coin money, and authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin).
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enact an American Navigation Act, giving United States vessels a monopoly on shipping 
American commodities by simple majority vote of the Congress.  Opponents wanted to 
require a two-thirds vote for a Navigation Act so that a “few rich merchants” from New 
York, Philadelphia and Boston could not “plunder the South.”185
Sometimes the norm against discrimination lead to over-reaction.  The Framers 
worried that “tonnage fees”—imposed on ships according to their weight to pay for the 
upkeep of the harbor, wharves and lighthouses—might be used to discriminate against 
out-of-staters.  The Constitution prohibits states from imposing tonnage, in absence of 
Congressional approval.186  Some discrimination makes sense because the tonnage rates 
appropriate for vessels carrying full cargoes across the Atlantic that visited no more than 
twice a year would be far too high for local or short-haul vessels that were in and out of 
the harbor with half cargoes many times a week.  The states, moreover, would be 
expected to dredge the harbors, erect the light houses and keep up the piers and wharves 
by state taxes alone and tonnage was a fine way to get the users to pay for the state’s 
services.187  The prohibition on tonnage was thus probably an overreaction, driven by the 
185
  George Mason, Speech before the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS
(Madison Notes).  Cf. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 28 (“Whilst the Commercial plunder of the South stimulates the rapacious 
Trader.”)
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 10.  See James Madison, Speech at the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 625 (arguing that he was convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its 
nature indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority). 
187 See James McHenry, Notes of the Federal Convention (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 504 
(McHenry notes)(saying that it “does not appear that the national legislature can erect light houses or clean 
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strong norms of nondiscrimination and anger at the rogue states who could be expected to 
misbehave if allowed to.  In sum, the norm that states had to respect the rights of citizens 
of other states was strong in the Constitutional debates, but in these illustrations, it shows 
up as an argument for or against other provisions and not as an attack on any existing 
interstate tolls or restrictions.
As the Constitution was developing, Madison himself seems to have considered 
his mercantilist port- preferences project to be more important than the anti-discrimination 
rule.  When Virginia passed its port restrictions in 1784, it added an exemption for 
Virginia-owned ships, which could dock anywhere they wanted.  Madison confessed to 
Monroe that applying the port restriction to out-of-state citizens, but not to Virginia 
citizens, was a violation of the Articles of Confederation, an “erratum”, which “will no 
doubt be rectified.”188  The comment is just cavalier enough about the violation of the 
Articles to show that in Madison’s mind, the restrictive, port preference project was more 
important than the anti-discrimination norm.
The Constitutional document, in fact, arguably does some harm to a barrier free 
market because it failed to bring over the Articles’ express prohibition on discrimination.  
The norm against trade barriers was strong through the period, and was not in contention, 
but apparently the very lack of contention meant that the Constitutional drafters did not 
repeat the Articles’ prohibition of discrimination.  The Articles of Confederation,189 but 
out or preserve the navigation of harbours”)(emphasis omitted).  See also McHenry and Carrol (Sept. 15, 
1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 625 (Madison notes)(moving unsuccessfully that “no State shall be 
restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting light-houses.”) 
188
  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 MADISON PAPERS 102.  
189 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
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not the Constitutional text, prohibit a states’ imposing a tax or restriction on an out-of-
state citizen it is unwilling to impose on its citizen.  Arguably the omission did little 
harm.  The Courts have actively developed what is called the “dormant commerce 
clause” to prevent discrimination directed toward out-of-staters.190  Some commentators 
have, however, opposed application of an anti-discrimination norm, at least in its 
strongest versions, on the ground that the Constitution did not include it in its text.191
Congress can act to regulate commerce between the states, because the specific words of 
clause 3, the commerce clause, gives Congress the power, but the dormant commerce 
clause, giving the judiciary the responsibility of enforcing nondiscrimination by the states 
in absence of federal legislation, must rest on norms that were well expressed in the 
Articles but not in the Constitution.192
190 See reviews cited at supra note 170.
191
  Justices Scalia and Thomas would be willing to roll back the dormant commerce clause to reach only 
discriminations on the face of a state statute, in part because there is no authority for anti-discrimination in 
the text.  Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines Inc, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 1246 (1995): CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 94-95 (1987).  See also Lino Graglia, The Supreme Court and the American 
Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 67, 70 (A. Dan Tarlock, ed. 
1981)(arguing that in absence of text, policing discrimination against out of staters is a function the Court 
should not perform); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L. J. 569, 570-571 (accord, dormant commerce clause 
without basis in text or structure).  
192
  Mark Gergen, The Selfish State and The Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117-1118 (1988) would find 
the prohibition against discrimination in the Article IV, section 2 language that “Citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States,” but the language needs to be 
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C. Words without Controversies
There are also 21 quotes within the sample which are not attached to any remedy 
or in which the reference is too vague to ascertain what is meant.   These quotes are not 
included in the 136 cites or 100%, used to determine what percentage any one advocated 
program represents.   Indeed the quotes without controversies are undercollected, since I 
increasingly passed over quotes without a clear reference to a program as time went.  
Nonetheless, this sample gives some indication of what is out there, outside of the 
references to programs that I use as the baseline 100%. 
Fifteen quotes in the sample, without any program attached, contrast “commerce” 
with either “manufacturing” or “agriculture,” at least to the extent of listing commerce 
separately.193  Some of the quotes show that the Founders worried about too much 
stretched to reach corporations as well as individual citizens, to reach goods as well as citizens and to focus 
on accomplishing an economic union, more than preserving individual “rights.”  
193 (1) James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 M ADISON 
PAPERS 351 (calling for new Constitution to fix defects of commercial affairs blocked by perverseness of 
particular States, including law of naturalization and of copyright, incorporations for national purposes, the 
providing of national universities and the building of “canals and other works of general utility”); (1) 
PENNSYLVANIA MERCURY (June 28, 1787), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 210 (saying that 
“agriculture, manufactures and commerce, shall impart their blessings, and enrich our country”); (2) 
NORWICH PACKET (July 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 167 (“Commerce must take the 
lead, agriculture next follow, and manufactures should bring up the rear”); (3) PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE
(Aug. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 182 (means of wealth are agriculture and 
manufactures; wealth has no business with commerce, 'till she derives it from the products of the earth, or 
from her own arts); (4) James Madison, Debate at the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS 452 (saying that Connecticut and New Jersey were “agricultural, not commercial States”); (5) 
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Elbridge Gerry, Debate at the Federal Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 F ARRAND’S RECORDS 635 (Rufus 
King notes)(objecting to the Constitution because “the Power given respectg. Commerce will enable the 
Legislature to create corporations and monopolies”); (6) Letter from Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to 
Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 352 (arguing that state debtor relief 
legislation was thought necessary as a security to commerce, in which the interest of foreigners as well as 
the citizens of different states may be affected); (7) NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL (Oct. 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 597 (saying that 
landed property in England will never be sufficiently distributed, to give the powers of wholly into the 
hands of the people, but that here commerce and manufacturing throw a vast weight of property into the 
democratic scale); (8) THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 27, 1787) 
(referring to “rivalship” between agriculture and commerce); (9) “AN AMERICAN” (TENCH COXE), TO 
RICHARD HENRY LEE, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Dec. 28, 1787), reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 165, 169 (contrasting commerce and agriculture and arguing that even in 
commercial states, agriculture predominates);  (10)  AN OLD MAN, CARLISLE GAZETTE (Jan. 2, 1788), 
reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 228 (reporting toast to an increase of the agriculture, 
manufactures and commerce of America);  (11) CENTINEL VIII, PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER
(Jan. 2, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 233 (saying that “[e]very concern of individuals 
will be sacrificed to the gratification of the men in power, who will institute injurious monopolies and 
shackle commerce with every device of avarice”); (12) THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 219 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (first published January 5, 1788) (saying that many mechanics and manufacturers are 
immediately connected with commerce and that merchants are their natural friends); (13) RESOLUTIONS OF 
THE TRADESMEN OF THE TOWN OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Jan. 8, 1788), reprinted in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 292 (saying that if the proposed frame of government should be rejected, the 
small remains of commerce yet left us, will be annihilated, the various trades and handicrafts dependent 
thereon, must decay);  (14) A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION, BOSTON (Feb. 
1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 278 (saying that “there are few who do not unite in the 
general wish for the restoration of public faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry, 
under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government”);  (15) Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South 
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commerce, as well as too little, which is consistent with mercantilism.  Some, blessedly, 
have no specific remedy in mind.  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, for instance, adopted a 
physiocratic argument in South Carolina that there were only three ways for a nation to 
acquire wealth – the first is by war, which is “robbery.”  The second is in commerce, 
“which is generally cheating.”  The third is agriculture, which is “the only honest 
way.”194  The theory of the Physiocrats that all other human activities were parasites upon 
agriculture, would, of course, have been especially attractive to the planters.    The 
natural supremacy of agriculture under physiocratic principles, however, did not seem to 
have any program attached to it in America.   
The usages of the word “commerce,” listed separately from “agriculture” or 
“manufacturing,” do not seem to preclude more inclusive definitions of “commerce.”   
“Regulation of commerce” is sometimes used to mean only nationalizing the state 
imposts195 or used to justify other enumerated powers.  Those usages, however, do not 
seem to preclude other government programs that would be allowed under broader 
Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 581 (saying that 
“there are but three ways for a nation to acquire wealth – the first is by war … which is robbery; the second 
is in commerce, which is generally cheating; the third is agriculture, the only honest way”). 
Justice Thomas has a sample of 12 cites in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) in 
which agriculture or manufacturing are contrasted with “commerce,” only three of which seem to overlap 
with this sample.   
194
  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina Ratification Convention (May 14, 1788), in 2 DEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION 581.  
195
 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (first published Nov. 17, 1787) (saying 
that some states—e.g. New York—have the opportunity of rendering others—Connecticut and New 
Jersey—tributary to them by commercial regulations by laying duties on importations).
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definitions of “commerce.”  “Regulation of commerce” was an omnibus term with a 
cloud of specific and more general references.  The more specific meanings do not seem 
to exclude any others.   Given how “utterly wrongheaded”  the Physiograts were, 196 in 
any event, it does seem quite lucky that physiogratic attitudes toward “commerce” are not 
the only meaning embodied in the Constitution.  
Words that do not have any programs attached to them also do not seem to carry 
any water as a cause tending toward the adoption of the Constitution.  Clause 3, for 
instance, gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, but there 
were no controversies in trade with the Indians that show up in the sample.  The 
Constitution just repeated the power allowed to the Congress by the Articles of 
Confederation, without treating the power as having any weight. 197  Regulation of trade 
196
    Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUMB. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999); see EDWIN R.A. 
SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 125-142 (4th ed. 1921) (describing the physiocrats 
and their influence).   Voluntary trades add value to both sides, if they are voluntary, and manufacture adds 
immense value to its raw materials, not all of which come from agriculture.  Adam Smith’s critique, 
concluding that agriculture is not the exclusive source of wealth, was devastating.   There is something 
awful about reading a distinction between agriculture and “nonproductive” activity as the Constitutional 
distinction, even if planters liked it.  This is supposed to be a durable Constitution, interpreted 
sympathetically.  Commerce, in any event, has other definitions in 1787 in which agriculture is not the key 
distinction.
197
  The Congressional trade with the Indians comes from the Articles of Confederation, which provided 
that congress had the power to regulate “the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members 
of any of the States.”  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX.  It was added to a draft of the commerce 
clause, which provided that Congress could regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, 
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with the Indians is not a substantial cause of the Constitution, even though the trade with 
the Indians is included in the words.  So similarly other usages of “commerce,” without 
any program or remedy behind them can not have had substantial influence on the 
adoption of the Constitution. 
Finally, six references to “commerce” are so general as to not give a sufficient 
clue about the controversy or even arena they are talking about.198  Some are important, 
for example, George Washington’s cover letter for the Constitution citing the power to
regulate commerce as one of the reasons for ratification.  The interpretation here is that 
on September 4, 1787 by motion of the Committee of Eleven (chaired by Brearly) and adopted without 
dissent.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 493, 498 (Madison notes). 
198
  (1) Letter from [George Washington] the President of the Federal Convention to the President of 
Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in FORMATION OF THE UNION (saying that desire is for general government to 
have the power to make war, peace, and treaties, levy money and regulate commerce); (2) Alexander 
Hamilton’s Conjectures About the New Constitution (Sept. 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 9 
(saying the Constitution probably would be ratified because “the good will of the commercial interest 
throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government capable of 
regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union.”); (3) THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 72 
(Alexander Hamilton) (first published November 24, 1787) (saying that “[an] unity of commercial, as well 
as political interests, can only result from an unity of government”); (4) CENTINEL VI, PENNSYLVANIA 
PACKET (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY  99 (opposing the Constitution by 
saying that people are so impatient to “reap the golden harvest of regulated commerce, that they will not 
take time to secure their liberty and happiness”); (5) Governor Edmund Randolph’s Reasons for not 
Signing the Constitution, Richmond, Virginia (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1 D EBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 601 
(saying that the members of that Convention thought unanimously, that the control of commerce should be 
given to Congress); (6) THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 314 (James Madison) (first published January 26, 1788) 
(saying that the regulation of commerce is a new power, but one that few oppose).
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these references are trying to talk about all cases fitting under “regulation of commerce” 
and that they are therefore proxies for the full universe of “commerce,” the content and 
mix of which are determined by the other cites in the sampling.  These six too-general 
references are not part of the total sample used to calculate percentages for the other 
categories. 
D. How Important was Commerce as a Cause?
The programs the advocates contemplated within the commerce clause were in 
total very modest.  The retaliatory impost against the British and the monopoly for 
American vessels for American commodities were touted by the Federalists, but they 
were never enacted, once the Constitution was adopted, even in the overwhelmingly 
Federalist Congress that could do as it wished on the issue.  As it turned out, even 
proponents of the Constitution did not really want to provoke the ire of the British and 
risk loss of access to the British ports, once they thought seriously about it.  Port 
preferences were even more starkly rejected, within the Convention itself.   “Regulation 
of commerce” was also a code word to justify replacing the 2-1/2% New York state 
impost with a 5% federal impost, but that replacement was needed to pay Revolutionary 
War debts and restore the public credit, and it should be understood therefore as a tax and 
war debt issue, adequately covered by the tax powers clause.  There is no purely 
commerce clause program that had any legs.
Given the modest original size of the commerce clause, it is ironic that the 
commerce clause has come to be viewed as the general jurisdictional boundary of the 
federal government.  The commerce clause seems in strict historical context no more 
important than the next clause, clause 4, which authorized Congress to make a national 
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bankruptcy law.  The bankruptcy power remained, a “mere dead letter,” as Story’s 
Commentaries put it in 1833.199 A national bankruptcy act was not passed until 1898,200
considerably too late for the bankruptcy to be a live cause of the Constitution.  Given the 
110 year delay, the bankruptcy clause can not be called a significant cause of the 
Constitution, although it is listed in section 8.  The same is true for the commerce clause.  
Arguably recognizably modest clauses, like punishing counterfeiting (clause 6) and 
establishing post roads and post offices (clause 7) are more meaningful historical causes.  
Given its modest original size, the modern importance of the commerce clause 
comes, much like a panda’s thumb, because of evolutionary growth.  A panda’s thumb is 
apparently not a thumb at all, but is rather an evolutionary development from a once-tiny 
wrist bone, which evolved over time into a sharp tool to strip bamboo.201   Its humble 
roots do not mean that it is illegitimate.  Pandas, for example, do need their bamboo-
stripping “thumbs” for survival.  So similarly, the growth of the commerce clause was 
driven by “the necessities of the Union”202 and the demand for a federal government able 
to serve a national economy.   Evolution for survival is not an illegitimate process. 
199 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 3:§§ 1105 (1833), reprinted in 2 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 639, 641.
200 See, e.g., Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160 (1991) 
(describing the history of American bankruptcy legislation and proposals through the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898.)
201 STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1980).
202
  Edmund Randolph, Draft of the Constitution for the Committee of Detail, Federal Convention, July-
August 1787, 2 Farrand 142.
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Still, the modesty of the commerce power makes it difficult to lean on it to 
explain the Constitutional Revolution.  The Constitution replaced the sovereignty of the 
states with the sovereignty of the people, and created a new government in the federal 
level supreme over the states.  Clause 1, the first power listed, gives the Federal 
government the power to tax to provide for the common defense and general welfare.  
The tax power gave effect and consequence to the federal government.  The explanation 
for the Constitutional Revolution thus plausibly resides in clause 1, tax to provide for 
common defense and general welfare, rather than in clause 3, the commerce clause.   The 
power to adopt programs that the country did not in fact want and Constitutional 
language with no significant programs or grievances attached to it gives no meaningful 
help in explaining why the Founders created the Constitutional revolution.  The important 
causes of the Constitution have to be lie elsewhere.
